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DENISE COTE, District Judge: 
   
This Opinion addresses cross-motions for summary judgment 
filed by The Associated Press (“AP”), a news cooperative, and 
Meltwater US Holdings Inc., Meltwater News US Inc., and 
Meltwater News US1 Inc. (collectively “Meltwater”), an Internet 
media monitoring service.  In this action, AP principally 
contends that Meltwater is infringing AP’s copyright in its 
published news stories.  Meltwater uses a computer program to 
scrape news articles on the web and, among other things, 
provides excerpts of those stories, including many AP stories, 
in reports it sends each weekday to its subscribers.  Meltwater 
does not dispute that it has taken expressive content from AP 
stories that is protected by the Copyright Act, but has 
interposed five defenses to AP’s copyright infringement claim.   
Meltwater’s principal defense against the infringement 
claim is that its excerpting of AP news stories is a fair use.  
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Even though Meltwater’s service is a closed system for 
subscribers only, Meltwater equates itself with Internet search 
engines.  It argues that search engines transform the work they 
take from Internet news sites by using that content for a new 
purpose, that is, as an integral part of an information-location 
tool.  According to Meltwater, this transformative purpose 
qualifies as a fair use of the copyright-protected material.  It 
will be assumed for purposes of this Opinion that Internet 
search engines are a transformative use of copyrighted work.  
Nonetheless, based on undisputed facts, AP has shown that it is 
entitled to summary judgment on its claim that Meltwater has 
engaged in copyright infringement and that Meltwater’s copying 
is not protected by the fair use doctrine.   
This Opinion begins with a description of the facts taken 
from the parties’ submissions on these cross-motions for summary 
judgment.  The facts are largely undisputed; where there are 
factual disputes, those will be noted.  Following a description 
of AP’s business as it relates to these claims, and then 
Meltwater’s, there will be a brief description of the procedural 
history of this lawsuit.  The next sections of the Opinion will 
analyze the legal issues.  They will include a discussion of 
Meltwater’s five affirmative defenses to the claim of copyright 
infringement: fair use, implied license, equitable estoppel, 
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laches, and copyright misuse.  Finally, this Opinion will 
address Meltwater’s motion for summary judgment on AP’s 
secondary infringement claims and some of Meltwater’s 
evidentiary objections.  
      
BACKGROUND 
I. AP 
AP was established in 1846; it is owned by over 1,400 
newspapers across the United States and employs a staff of 
approximately 3,700 people.  On any given day it produces 
between 1,000 and 2,000 news articles.  
Each article is the result of a process that involves a 
number of creative decisions by AP reporters and editors.  
First, AP must select the topic to be covered in the article.  
The selection process can involve sifting through numerous press 
releases, comments made by politicians, and news tips received 
by AP in order to decide which topics are worthy of coverage.  
The actual writing of the story is often an iterative process, 
involving consultations between the reporter and editor about 
how to handle the assignment.  During this process, the articles 
are reviewed for “completeness, clarity, balance and accuracy.”  
The structure of a news article is itself the product of 
strategic and stylistic choices.  For instance, breaking news 
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stories are traditionally organized in the form of an “inverted 
triangle.”  The purpose of the “inverted triangle” structure is 
to include “as much key information as possible in the ‘lede,’ 
or first portion of the story.”  As AP’s Standards Editor has 
explained, an AP story lede “is meant to convey the heart of the 
story, rather than serving as a teaser for the remainder of the 
story.”  In connection with this action, the AP obtained 
copyright registrations for thirty-three of its articles 
(“Registered Articles”).1
The news products that AP offers take many forms.  For 
instance, subscribers can choose to subscribe to a regional news 
product, like AP’s Latin American News, or Asia-Pacific News.  
Alternatively, a subscriber can select an AP product that is 
   
                     
1 Each Registered Article is appended to the plaintiff’s amended 
complaint.  They include stories on a diverse set of subjects, 
as the following examples illustrate: exhibits F (Sri Lankan 
fruit traders); G (Casino jobs in Ohio); H (anti-austerity 
protests in Portugal); I, O, U (life and death of former Alaska 
Senator Ted Stevens); J (anti-doping rules for pentathlon); K 
(Mississippi Blues Trail marker for deceased singer); L 
(parliamentary vote in Egypt), M (“Senate upset erases Alaska 
seniority”); N (secret CIA prison in Romania); P (snowboarder 
Kevin Pearce); Q (one-year anniversary of border agent’s death); 
R & X (WikiLeaks suspect); S (security guard’s ear cut off); T 
(Congressman cleared in DOJ probe); V (case against VECO CEO); W 
(late Christmas celebrations); Y ($5B deal between Northeast 
Utilities & NStar); and Z (fact check of Romney’s Solyndra 
claim).  The Appendix gives three examples of the Registered 
Articles chosen for their differences in length and shows an 
excerpt copied and distributed by Meltwater from these three 
examples.   
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 6 
focused on a particular industry, like AP’s Business Alert, 
Defense Alert, or Technology Alert.  
Each of the thirty-three Registered Articles at issue in 
this lawsuit was written by an AP reporter.  Most of articles 
authored by AP reporters are published by its members or 
licensees and not by AP itself.  Thus, a principal component of 
AP’s revenue comes from licensing fees it earns by licensing 
uses of its news products to its roughly 8,000 licensees.  AP 
earns hundreds of millions of dollars in licensing fees 
annually.  
In the digital age, AP’s license agreements have expanded 
to permit the publication of its articles on the Internet.  AP’s 
license agreements with its digital and commercial clients 
account for more than $75 million of AP’s annual gross revenue.  
Many of the websites on which AP content appears permit readers 
to access the articles without paying any fee.     
AP’s licensing agreements are crafted around the kind of 
redistribution rights the licensee wishes to have.  For 
instance, AP’s licensing agreements with LexisNexis and Factiva 
permit those services to give their customers access to full AP 
articles and to search through AP’s archives.  AP also has 
licensing agreements that permit the distribution of excerpts 
from or snippets of its articles.  The license agreements 
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between AP and three news clipping services that are competitors 
of Meltwater are examples of this kind of license.  One such 
license granted the Internet news clipping service a license to 
distribute “AP text scraped from third party AP licensee 
websites (“AP Articles”) . . . as well as links to AP Articles 
and excerpts of AP Articles.”  In a second such license, AP 
permits the Internet news clipping service to redistribute 
“Snippets” of AP articles “as a part of an aggregated feed of 
licensed content,” to a primary market of Media Monitoring & 
Evaluation companies who cater to “Internal corporate 
communications and PR professionals and their external agents.”  
This license defines “Snippets” to mean “headlines and leading 
140 characters from AP content.”  In a final example, the 
licensing agreement allows the news clipping service to make 
available directly or via its affiliate “snippets of [certain AP 
content] in response to search requests.”   
AP also offers a web-based platform known as AP Exchange to 
its licensees, which permits the licensees to search AP articles 
by keywords.  Each AP article contains metadata tags.  These 
tags attach to certain information appearing in AP articles 
including people, companies, geographic locations, and 
organizations.  Through AP Exchange, customers can run either 
simple or advanced searches to locate AP news stories.  This 
Case 1:12-cv-01087-DLC   Document 156    Filed 03/21/13   Page 7 of 91
 
 8 
platform also allows AP’s customers to save their searches and 
to receive search results on an ongoing basis.  AP’s customers 
can receive email alerts when an article that is responsive to 
one of their custom searches has been published.  In addition, 
AP has licensed its content to customers that, in turn, permit 
their users to search for AP articles using keyword search 
terms.      
II. Meltwater News 
Meltwater is an international “software as a service” 
(“SaaS”) company that operates in twenty-seven countries.  It 
was founded in 2001 in Norway.  Its United States subsidiaries 
currently have four hundred employees, nine U.S. offices, and an 
annual income of [REDACTED] of dollars.   
In 2005, Meltwater began offering a news monitoring service 
to subscribers in the United States called Meltwater News.  
Meltwater News now has more than [REDACTED] customers in the 
United States.  Its U.S. customers are businesses, non-profit 
organizations, and government agencies.  An annual subscription 
fee costs thousands of dollars.   
Meltwater News subscribers have access to Meltwater’s 
“Global Media Monitoring” product, which offers a suite of 
online services.  The Global Media Monitoring product enables 
users to monitor the news based on the presence of certain words 
Case 1:12-cv-01087-DLC   Document 156    Filed 03/21/13   Page 8 of 91
 
 9 
or phrases in news articles appearing on the Internet and to 
receive excerpts of those news articles.  Meltwater uses 
automated computer programs or algorithms to copy or “scrape” an 
article from an online news source, index the article, and 
deliver verbatim excerpts of the article to its customers in 
response to search queries.2
Meltwater markets its services to communications and public 
relations professionals as a tool that will assist them in 
locating “mentions” of their businesses in the media, in 
tracking their company’s press releases, and in conducting 
comparative research.  Some of Meltwater’s marketing materials 
and sales representatives also advertise Meltwater News as a 
useful tool for staying informed of general news developments.  
One Meltwater sales representative described Meltwater News as 
“provid[ing] the most news in the most efficient manner” and 
  Through this automated mechanism, 
Meltwater copied each of the thirty-three Registered Articles at 
issue in this litigation and delivered excerpts from them to 
subscribers.  
                     
2 Meltwater purports to dispute that the excerpts that Meltwater 
distributed from the Registered Articles can be found verbatim 
in the Registered Articles.  While it is undisputed that 
Meltwater's excerpts do not contain the complete article, a 
comparison of the excerpts with the Registered Article shows 
that the excerpts were taken word-for-word from the original.  
There is, therefore, no genuine dispute that the excerpts are 
taken verbatim from the AP articles.  See, e.g. Appendix.  
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referred to the Meltwater News Reports as “customized news 
digest[s].”  Another Meltwater employee has recommended telling 
customers that a Meltwater News excerpt “saves you time so you 
don’t have to read the full article.”   
Meltwater competes with AP and its licensees for business.  
Meltwater identifies companies and services like LexisNexis, 
Cision, Google News, and BurrellesLuce as its competitors.  Each 
of these companies has held an AP license.  Meltwater has 
succeeded in winning what it described as a “mega-contract” away 
from an AP licensee, and both AP and Meltwater have submitted 
bids to the same potential customers.  In 2010, for instance, 
both AP and Meltwater submitted proposals to the House of 
Representatives in response to an “official solicitation for 
proposals to provide web based delivery of local, national and 
international news.”   
Like Internet search engines, Meltwater News employs 
automated computer programs known as “crawlers” to scan the 
Internet for news.  Meltwater’s crawlers scan approximately 
162,000 online news websites from over 190 countries each day to 
create an index of the websites’ content.  The program usually 
crawls a news website at roughly [REDACTED] intervals.  Most of 
these websites make their articles available to readers without 
charge.   
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The crawlers extract and download content from the 
websites.  The downloaded content is organized into a structured 
internal format that has seven fields, including a timestamp 
reflecting when the document was first seen by the crawler.  The 
extracted content is then placed in a queue for indexing.  Using 
an Application Programming Interface or API, an index is created 
that links or “maps” most of the words in the document to the 
document.       
 A. News Reports 
Meltwater’s creation of the index permits its subscribers 
to search for and request delivery of information that is 
responsive to their search queries.  Its subscribers can conduct 
two types of searches of the index.    
First, a customer can use the Meltwater News platform to 
set up standing search queries known as “agents.”  An agent is a 
single string of words or phrases that will be used in searching 
Meltwater’s index of online news content.  For example, a 
customer interested in obtaining information on education policy 
might create an agent that reads: “(“teachers” or “students”) 
and education* and policies.”  The creation of an agent query 
allows the particular search to be conducted automatically on a 
recurring basis.  A basic subscription offers a customer the 
ability to create five standing agent queries.   
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Customers receive agent search results in two ways.  Most 
customers receive emails every weekday that contain the excerpts 
responsive to their standing search requests.  These are labeled 
“News Reports.”  Customers can also view those same search 
results by logging onto their Meltwater News online account, 
where they can see all of their News Reports from the last seven 
months.   
A typical News Report takes the following form.  At the top 
of the News Report a banner appears that reads “News Report from 
Meltwater News.”  Directly beneath the banner appears a table 
entitled “Report Overview.”  The Table ordinarily consists of 
two columns; the first column contains the name of the “agent” 
query that retrieved hits; the second displays the raw number of 
hits in a given period of time (such as 3 in 1 day, or 635 in 23 
hours).   
The actual search results follow the Report Overview.  They 
are organized in subcategories based on the agent query to which 
they respond.  Within each agent category, the results appear in 
reverse chronological order, with the excerpt of the most 
recently published article appearing first.3
                     
3 If a responsive article was published on more than one website, 
the News Report will often retrieve duplicate results.  When a 
result is a duplicate it is clustered with the other identical 
results.  The most recent publication of the article will be the 
  Three icons appear 
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next to each search result; they read, “Translate,” “Share,” and 
“Archive.”  AP articles account for over a third of the search 
results in some News Reports.  
Each search result in the News Report generally includes 
the following text: (1) the headline or title of the article and 
a hyperlink to the URL for the website from which the article 
was indexed; (2) information identifying the article’s source, 
such as the publisher and the country of origin; and (3) usually 
two excerpts from the article.  The first excerpt consists of up 
to 300 characters (including white space) from the opening text 
of the article or lede.  The second excerpt is shorter and is 
known as the “Hit Sentence.”  It is approximately 140 characters 
(not including white spaces) “surrounding a single, 
algorithmically chosen appearance of one of the customer’s 
matched search keywords.”  If the keyword appears in the lede, 
then the lede is repeated twice.  
 On occasion, the hyperlink to the article no longer leads 
to the article because the article has been removed from the 
web.  Meltwater contends that when that occurs, the hyperlink 
will lead the Meltwater subscriber to the website where the 
                                                                  
hit that is initially visible in the News Report.  To the left 
of the headline of the visible result is a plus sign.  Clicking 
the plus sign permits the subscriber to see the duplicate 
results.   
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article originally appeared, and the reader will see whatever 
content the operator of the webpage has chosen to display in 
place of the original article.  
B. Analytics 
A Meltwater News subscriber can choose to have certain 
charts and graphs included in their News Reports.  These charts 
and graphs -- known as “Dashboard Analytics” or “Mail Analytics” 
-- provide additional information about the search results.  For 
instance, customers who opt to have Mail Analytics included in 
their daily News Report will see a pie chart showing the three 
or four countries that have had the highest coverage of a 
particular agent.  They also have a choice of seeing an “up-and-
down coverage” chart that indicates whether the volume of 
coverage has gone up or down during a certain period of time, or 
a “word cloud” illustrating certain buzz words appearing in the 
search results.   
A subscriber can also view additional analysis of its agent 
searches by logging on to the Meltwater News platform.  When it 
logs on, it encounters a “dashboard” page containing five tools; 
some of these tools overlap with the tools that can be delivered 
in the News Reports.  Using the dashboard, the customer can view 
(1) a “tone analysis” tool, which analyzes whether the tone of 
the news coverage is negative, positive, or neutral; (2) a “word 
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cloud” graphic, which illustrates the frequency with which a 
keyword appears in the search results; (3) a list of the “top 
publications” providing the most coverage of a given agent 
query; (4) an “up-and-down trend analysis” chart, which 
indicates “whether the volume of media coverage related to a 
given search query has increased or decreased over a given 
period;” and (5) a map that illustrates the “geographical 
distribution of relevant news coverage.”   
C. Ad Hoc Searches 
The second way in which customers can conduct searches of 
the Meltwater News index is through an “ad hoc” search.  To 
perform an ad hoc search, a Meltwater News subscriber logs on to 
its Meltwater account, clicks on a “Search” tab, and types in 
keywords of its choice.   
Ad hoc searches do not generate News Reports, but the 
format for presenting the results generated by an ad hoc search 
is identical to that in News Reports.  The results of ad hoc 
searches are not saved on the Meltwater system unless the 
subscriber saves them to the subscriber’s own archive folder.  
There is no limit on the number of ad hoc searches that a 
subscriber can perform.     
D. Archiving 
A subscriber with a basic subscription has the ability to 
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archive material in two ways.  First, subscribers can archive 
any of their search results in a personal archive stored on 
Meltwater’s database.  For instance, as described above, an 
“Archive” button appears next to each excerpt contained in a 
Meltwater News Report.  Clicking this button archives the search 
result.  When a search result is archived in this way, the 
information stored in the archive includes (1) the headline or 
title of the article and the URL link; (2) a description of the 
source of the article; (3) an excerpt of the article, consisting 
only of the opening text; and (4) any text the user has typed or 
pasted into a comment box.  In other words, the Hit Sentence is 
not automatically archived.   
Second, Meltwater offers a tool called “Article Editor” 
that is accessible from the Meltwater News online platform.  
Clicking on the Article Editor tool causes a pop-up window to 
appear.  The window contains boxes with the labels “Date, Title, 
Opening Text, Body Text, URL, Name of Publisher, and Country.”  
The subscriber can type text into these boxes or can copy and 
paste text from other websites.  For instance, if a customer 
clicks on a hyperlink provided as part of a search result, the 
customer can proceed to copy the article from the publishing 
website and paste the text into the Article Editor.  The text 
can be saved in an “external archive folder” on Meltwater’s 
Case 1:12-cv-01087-DLC   Document 156    Filed 03/21/13   Page 16 of 91
 
 17 
system for as long as the subscriber remains a customer.  
E. Newsletter and Newsfeed 
For an additional fee, Meltwater News assists its 
subscribers in creating their own newsletters.  Material that 
has been saved in a subscriber’s archive folder -- search 
results or material entered into the Article Editor -- can be 
incorporated into a “Newsletter” and sent to third-party 
recipients.     
Alternatively, subscribers can elect to have their search 
results incorporated into a Newsfeed on their internal or 
external website.  Meltwater describes the Newsfeed as a 
“dynamic list of search results, including links to full 
articles.”   
III. The Thirty-Three Registered Articles 
Meltwater delivered excerpts of each of the thirty-three 
Registered Articles to its customers in News Reports as a result 
of agent searches.4
                     
4 Meltwater does not retain ad hoc search results as part of its 
ordinary business practices.  Therefore, there is no evidence in 
the record indicating whether any excerpts from the thirty-three 
Registered Articles were provided to Meltwater subscribers in 
response to ad hoc searches. 
  Meltwater scraped the Registered Articles 
from roughly 1,200 websites -- including the websites of AP’s 
licensees and AP Hosted, which is a private label website where 
AP hosts content for its members.  Twenty-four of the thirty-
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three articles were published within six months of the date 
Meltwater responded to a discovery request in this action.  As a 
result, Meltwater was able to calculate from its records that it 
made at least 22,297 excerpts from the twenty-four Registered 
Articles available to its customers in the United States in 
response to agent queries.    
The parties have not calculated the percentage of each 
original AP news story that was excerpted and delivered in each 
of the News Reports, but it probably ranged from as low as 4.5% 
to slightly over 60%.  There are several factors that affect the 
calculation of the percentage.  One is the length of the 
Registered Article.  The average length of the full text of the 
thirty-three Registered Articles is 2,571 characters (not 
including spaces), or 504 words.  But, some of the articles are 
short and some are long; they vary in length from 75 words to 
1,321 words.  Moreover, if the keyword that is searched appears 
in the lede, then the lede and Hit Sentence will overlap.  AP 
has shown that with respect to some of the Registered Articles, 
a single Meltwater excerpt consisted of more than 30% of the 
text of the article and in at least one instance it constituted 
61% of the article's text.  
For example, from the shortest Registered Article -- 
entitled “Modern pentathlon tightens anti-doping policy” -- 
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Meltwater delivered the following excerpt: 
MONACO (AP) -- Modern pentathlon has joined other 
sports in adopting a “no needles” policy as part of 
its anti-doping rules ahead of the 2012 London 
Olympics. 
. . . says athletes can receive injections only from a 
“certified medical professional” after an appropriate 
diagnosis and only if there is no alternative. 
 
The full text of the Registered Article reads as follows: 
 
MONACO (AP) -- Modern pentathlon has joined other 
sports in adopting a “no needles” policy as part of 
its anti-doping rules ahead of the 2012 London 
Olympics. 
Governing body UIPM says athletes can receive 
injections only from a “certified medical 
professional” after an appropriate diagnosis and only 
if there is no alternative. 
The UIPM says all injections must be reported to 
competition doctors. 
Governing bodies in cycling, gymnastics and rowing 
have also introduced “no needles” rules this year. 
 
Some of Meltwater’s customers have received multiple 
excerpts from the same AP article, apparently in a single News 
Report.  In such instances, the percentage of the article that 
is provided to the Meltwater customer may increase since the Hit 
Sentence in the various excerpts can change.   
Excerpts from the Registered Articles were also included in 
ten Newsletters created by Meltwater customers in the United 
States.  There is no evidence, however, that any Meltwater 
subscriber used the Meltwater Newsletter feature to cut and 
paste a complete copy of any of the thirty-three Registered 
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Articles into its customized newsletter.   
Finally, Meltwater subscribers only clicked on the 
hyperlinks for seven of the thirty-three Registered Articles.  
The average click-through rate for the thirty-three Registered 
Articles is roughly 0.08%.5  Meltwater has not provided any 
information on any other measure of its click-through rates.6
 
 
                     
5 For twenty-six of the Registered Articles, Meltwater’s 
investigation in response to AP's discovery requests uncovered 
no clicks.  For these articles, regardless of the number of 
times a hyperlink was presented to a customer, the click-through 
rate is 0%.  The click-through data for the remaining seven 
articles is as follows: (1)“AP Exclusive: Inside Romania’s 
secret CIA prison” was provided to Meltwater subscribers 134 
times, and the accompanying links were clicked on two occasions, 
resulting in a 1.5% click-through rate; (2) “When the most 
wonderful day of the year comes late”: 3,081 links, 1 click, 
0.03% click-through rate; (3) “Wikileaks suspect seen as hero, 
traitor”: 1,668 links, 1 click, 0.06% click-through rate; (4) 
“Northeast Utilities, NStar close $5B deal”: 2,917 links, 1 
click, 0.03% click-through rate; (5) “Apple lent weight to 
dividend comeback in 1Q”: 1,552 links, 1 click, 0.06%; (6) “7 
accused of $375M Medicare, Medicaid fraud”: 1,313 links, 12 
clicks, 0.91% click-through rate; (7) “Things are looking up for 
state budgets”: 2,361 links, 3 clicks, 0.13% click-through rate.  
   
6 AP made repeated requests during the discovery period for 
additional data on Meltwater’s click-through rates.  Meltwater 
indicated that it was not surprised by a click-through rate of 
.05% and refused to provide additional data.  It took the 
position that it would be burdensome to obtain more click-
through rate data since it does not keep such data in the normal 
course of its business.  Its Technical Manager of SaaS 
Operations opined that it might take twenty-four to thirty-six 
hours to run the necessary queries against its database and that 
it might also be prudent to copy the data first onto a separate 
set of servers so that the queries would not interfere with the 
performance of Meltwater’s system.   
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PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On February 14, 2012, AP filed this action against 
Meltwater.  AP’s amended complaint asserts six causes of action 
with respect to the Registered Articles: (1) copyright 
infringement; (2) contributory copyright infringement; (3) 
vicarious copyright infringement; (4) declaratory judgment of 
copyright infringement; (5) “hot news” misappropriation under 
New York common law; and (6) removal or alteration of copyright 
management information.  In response, Meltwater has raised four 
counterclaims: (1) declaratory judgment of non-infringement; (2) 
declaratory judgment of safe harbor from infringement claims 
based upon the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”); (3) 
libel per se; and (4) tortious interference with business 
relations. 
At a pretrial conference held on April 20, 2012, the Court 
proposed that the parties conduct an initial phase of discovery 
focused on Meltwater’s liability on AP’s copyright claims based 
on the nineteen articles identified in its original complaint.  
The parties thereafter agreed on a schedule that would permit 
them to focus on the core discovery needed to allow early 
briefing of the central legal issues in this case.  At a May 11 
conference, the Court determined that AP should be permitted to 
take targeted discovery not only of Meltwater’s alleged 
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infringement with respect to the Registered Articles, but also 
broader discovery of Meltwater’s general practices and 
procedures.   
On July 13, AP filed an amended complaint in which it 
included fourteen additional articles -- bringing the total 
number of Registered Articles at issue to thirty-three.  
Discovery proceeded on all thirty-three articles and broader 
issues to permit the parties to litigate through summary 
judgment practice the copyright infringement claim and 
Meltwater’s affirmative defenses to that claim.    
Both sides filed the instant cross-motions for summary 
judgment on November 9.7
                     
7 Meltwater has also moved for judgment on the pleadings with 
respect to AP’s claims of “hot news” misappropriation and 
removal or alteration of copyright management information.  AP 
has in turn moved for judgment on the pleadings as to 
Meltwater’s counterclaims for libel, tortious interference, and 
declaratory judgment of safe harbor under the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c).  Those motions are not 
addressed in this Opinion. 
  AP and Meltwater both move for summary 
judgment on Meltwater’s fair use defense.  AP has also moved for 
summary judgment on Meltwater’s implied license defense.  Each 
of Meltwater's affirmative defenses is implicated by this motion 
practice since Meltwater also contends that there are triable 
issues of fact on its affirmative defenses of implied license, 
equitable estoppel, laches, and copyright misuse that prevent 
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summary judgment from being entered for AP.  Meltwater has also 
moved for summary judgment on AP’s contributory and vicarious 
copyright infringement claims.                  
 These motions were fully submitted on January 23, 2013.  
Redacted sets of these motion papers were publicly filed in 
December 2012 and January 2013.  The defendants also filed on 
December 26, 2012 and January 24, 2013, two motions to strike 
certain declarations submitted by the plaintiff and the 
plaintiff’s Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.1 Statement.   
 Three amici curiae briefs were accepted for filing.  
Computer & Communications Industry Association (“CCIA”) 
represents that it is not filing in support of either AP or 
Meltwater.  Electronic Frontier Foundation and Public Knowledge 
have filed in support of Meltwater; the New York Times Company, 
Advance Publications, Inc., Gannett Co., Inc., the McClatchy 
Company, the Newspaper Association of America, and BurrellesLuce 
have filed in support of AP (“New York Times, et al.”).   
 
DISCUSSION 
 The parties have cross-moved for summary judgment.  Summary 
judgment may not be granted unless the submissions of the 
parties taken together “show that there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
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judgment as a matter of law.”  Rule 56(c), Fed. R. Civ. P.  The 
moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a 
material factual question, and in making this determination the 
court must view all facts in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party.  See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 
242, 247 (1986); Celotex Corp v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 
(1986); Azrielli v. Cohen Law Offices, 21 F.3d 512, 517 (2d Cir. 
1994) (“[T]he court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.”).  When 
the moving party has asserted facts showing that the nonmovant’s 
claims cannot be sustained, the opposing party must “set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial,” 
and cannot rest on the “mere allegations or denials” of his 
pleadings.  Rule 56(e), Fed. R. Civ. P.  See also Goenaga v. 
March of Dimes Birth Defects Found., 51 F.3d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 
1995).  In deciding whether to grant summary judgment, 
therefore, this Court must determine (1) whether a genuine 
factual dispute exists based on the evidence in the record, and 
(2) whether the fact in dispute is material based on the 
substantive law at issue. 
In this case, the substantive law governing the parties’ 
dispute is found in the law of copyright.  The Copyright Act of 
1976 invests a copyright holder with a bundle of exclusive 
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rights.  17 U.S.C. § 106 et seq.  This bundle consists of the 
rights to “reproduce, perform publicly, display publicly, 
prepare derivative works of, and distribute copies of” the 
copyrighted work.  Arista Records v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 117 
(2d Cir. 2010); see also 17 U.S.C. § 106.  “The principle 
purpose of the Copyright Act is to encourage the origination of 
creative works by attaching enforceable property rights to 
them.”  Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. v. West Pub. Co., 240 F.3d 
116, 122 (2d Cir. 2001).  
 To prevail on a claim of copyright infringement, “two 
elements must be proven: (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and 
(2) copying constituent elements of the work that are original.”  
Arista Records, 604 F.3d at 117 (citation omitted).  A 
certificate of copyright registration is prima facie evidence of 
both valid ownership of copyright and originality.  See Scholz 
Design, Inc. v. Sard Custom Homes, LLC, 691 F.3d 182, 186 (2d 
Cir. 2012); see also Boisson v. Banian, 273 F.3d 262, 268 (2d 
Cir. 2001).  The copying of the constituent elements of the work 
that are original can be established through direct or indirect 
evidence.  Boisson, 273 F.3d at 267.   
 The reporting of facts is not protectable under the 
Copyright Act since facts are “never original to an author.”  
Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Business Data, Inc., 166 
Case 1:12-cv-01087-DLC   Document 156    Filed 03/21/13   Page 25 of 91
 
 26 
F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 1999).  But compilations of facts may be 
protected under the Act since the arrangement or presentation of 
facts “can display originality.”  Id.  There is even more room 
for originality in descriptions of facts.  Id.  Thus, news 
articles may be entitled to protection under the Copyright Act 
to the extent they contain original expression.  Id.  
 AP has carried its burden to show both its ownership of a 
valid copyright in the Registered Articles and Meltwater’s 
copying of protected elements of those works.  Meltwater does 
not contest this showing, but relies instead on five affirmative 
defenses.  Its principal defense is that it made fair use of the 
Registered Articles.  It also contends that there are triable 
issues of fact that require a trial as to four additional 
defenses: its possession of an implied license, estoppel, 
laches, and copyright misuse.  Each of these defenses will be 
addressed in turn, but none of them prevents the issuance of 
summary judgment in AP’s favor based on its copyright claim.  
I. Fair Use   
Meltwater contends that its use of the Registered Articles 
is fair because Meltwater News functions as an Internet search 
engine, providing limited amounts of copyrighted material to its 
subscribers in response to their queries and thereby pointing 
its subscribers to a source of information online.  It contends 
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that this service is transformative of the original works.  
Based on undisputed evidence, Meltwater’s fair use defense 
fails.  
Notwithstanding the copyright protections guaranteed by 
Section 106 of the Copyright Act, the law of copyright 
recognizes the need for “breathing space.”  Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994); see also On Davis v. The 
Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 174 (2d Cir. 2001).  Thus, even where a 
plaintiff has established a prima facie case of copyright 
infringement, liability is excused where the defendant 
demonstrates that he made “fair use” of the plaintiff’s 
copyrighted work.  Because fair use is an affirmative defense, 
the burden of proof rests with party relying on the defense.  
Infinity Broadcast Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 
1998).  The availability of a fair use defense permits courts to 
avoid the “rigid application of the copyright statute” when “it 
would stifle the very creativity which the law is designed the 
foster.”  Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577.   
The fair use doctrine, although of common law origin, has 
been codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107.  This section provides that 
[n]otwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 
106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work . . . for 
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, 
teaching . . . scholarship, or research, is not an 
infringement of copyright.    
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17 U.S.C. § 107.  The applicability of the fair use defense is a 
mixed question of law and fact.  Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling 
Kindersley, Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 608 (2d Cir. 2006).  The issue 
of fair use may be resolved on summary judgment where the court 
determines that there is no genuine dispute of material facts.  
Id.   
 In determining whether a defendant has made fair use of the 
plaintiff’s copyrighted work, the court is guided by four non-
exclusive statutory factors: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including 
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for 
nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used 
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market 
for or value of the copyrighted work. 
 
17 U.S.C. § 107.  No single factor is determinative.  “All are 
to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of 
the purpose of copyright.”  Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578.  At 
bottom, “[t]he ultimate test of fair use is whether the 
copyright law’s goal of promoting the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts would be better served by allowing the use than by 
preventing it.”  Bill Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 608 (citation 
omitted).  
 When these four factors are examined in light of the 
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purpose of the copyright law, AP has shown through undisputed 
evidence that Meltwater’s copying is not protected by the fair 
use doctrine.  Each of these four factors will be examined in 
turn. 
A. Purpose and Character of the Use 
 The first factor of the fair use analysis poses a 
deceptively simple question.  It asks 
whether the new work merely supersedes the objects of 
the original creation, or instead adds something new, 
with a further purpose or different character, 
altering the first with new expression, meaning or 
message; it asks, in other words, whether and to what 
extent the new work is transformative. 
 
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (citation omitted).  A decision on 
whether a work is transformative need not be an all-or-nothing 
assessment.  Nihon, 166 F.3d at 72.  The inquiry asks not merely 
whether the new work is transformative, but also the extent to 
which it transforms the copyrighted work.  “[T]he more 
transformative the new work, the less will be the significance 
of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a 
finding of fair use.”  Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.  The inquiry 
into the transformative nature of the work is “guided by” the 
preamble to § 107, which directs attention to whether the use of 
copyrighted material is for the several listed purposes, among 
them news reporting and research.  Id. at 578.  But, the list of 
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fair uses included in the preamble of section 107 is only 
“illustrative.”  Infinity Broadcast Corp., 150 F.3d at 107 
(citation omitted).  Nonetheless, “the illustrative nature of 
the categories should not be ignored.”  Id.    
Of course, not all alterations of a copyrighted work are 
“transformative.”  A “use of copyrighted material that merely 
repackages or republishes the original is unlikely to be deemed 
a fair use” and a “change of format, though useful” is not 
transformative.  Infinity Broadcast Corp., 150 F.3d at 108 & n.2 
(citation omitted).  On the other hand, if copyrightable 
expression in the original work is used as “raw material, 
transformed in the creation of new information, new aesthetics, 
new insights and understandings -- this is the very type of 
activity that the fair use doctrine intends to protect for the 
enrichment of society.”  Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use 
Standard, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1111 (1990); see also Castle 
Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 142 
(2d Cir. 1998).  In considering whether the second work has 
transformed the original, it is appropriate to consider the 
percentage of the allegedly infringing work that is made up of 
the copyrighted work since this offers some indication of 
whether the defendant’s use of the “original materials has been 
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sufficiently transformative.”8
Another aspect of the first fair use factor is the extent 
to which the new work has a commercial or non-profit educational 
purpose.  The commerciality of the use must be considered with 
care.  After all, not-for-profit enterprises may infringe 
copyrights, and conversely, if   
  Bill Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 
611.  
commerciality carried presumptive force against a 
finding of fairness, the presumption would swallow 
nearly all of the illustrative uses listed in the 
preamble paragraph of § 107, including news reporting, 
comment, criticism, teaching, scholarship, and 
research, since these activities are generally 
conducted for profit in this country.   
 
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584 (citation omitted).  The fact that a 
given use is profit-driven is not the focus of the commerciality 
inquiry.  Instead, the “crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction 
is . . . whether the user stands to profit from the exploitation 
of the copyrighted material without paying the customary price.”  
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterp., 471 U.S. 539, 
562 (1985).  Thus, the fair use doctrine “distinguishes between 
a true scholar and a chisler who infringes a work for personal 
gain.”  Id. at 563 (citation omitted).    
                     
8 Where the copyrighted work constitutes a greater percentage of 
the secondary work, the latter work is more likely to be non-
transformative.  This inquiry is distinct from the analysis in 
the third factor, part of which considers what portion or 
percentage of the copyrighted work was used in the second work.  
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 A determination of whether a use “exploits” a copyrighted 
work calls for a careful exploration of the link between the 
defendant’s precise use of the copyrightable elements of the 
plaintiff’s work and the defendant’s financial gain.  Where a 
defendant did not gain “direct or immediate commercial 
advantage” from the copying, its status as a for-profit 
enterprise is less relevant.  Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 
Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 921 (2d Cir. 1994).  Conversely, “when the 
copier directly and exclusively acquires conspicuous financial 
rewards from its use of the copyrighted material” a finding of 
fair use is less likely.  Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 253 (2d 
Cir. 2006).  Of course, a use that generates value for the 
“broader public interest” weighs in favor of fair use.  Id.   
 In analyzing the purpose of the use, a court may consider 
as well other aspects of a defendant’s purpose.  For instance, 
was the copying intended to supplant the copyright holder’s 
“commercially valuable right of first publication.”  Harper & 
Row, 471 U.S. at 562.  As the term itself suggests, “[f]air use 
presupposes good faith and fair dealing.”  Id. (citation 
omitted). 
 Neither the purpose nor use of the Meltwater News Reports, 
nor its excerpts from the Registered Articles in the News 
Reports, is transformative.  Meltwater uses its computer 
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programs to automatically capture and republish designated 
segments of text from news articles, without adding any 
commentary or insight in its News Reports.  Meltwater copies AP 
content in order to make money directly from the undiluted use 
of the copyrighted material; this is the central feature of its 
business model and not an incidental consequence of the use to 
which it puts the copyrighted material.  Thus, it is not 
surprising that Meltwater’s own marketing materials convey an 
intent to serve as a substitute for AP’s news service.  
Meltwater describes its Meltwater News products as “News at a 
glance” and “News brought to you.”  They trumpet that “Meltwater 
News continuously tracks news sources, updating its database 
continuously throughout the day so searches return fresh, 
relevant content,” and advertise that “your news is delivered in 
easy to read morning and/or afternoon reports.”   
 Nor is Meltwater’s taking of copyrighted material more 
defensible because its business relates to news reporting and 
research –- two of the purposes of the fair use doctrine 
captured in the statute’s preamble.  The news reporting and 
research upon which Meltwater relies was not done by Meltwater 
but by AP; the copyrighted material that Meltwater has taken is 
the news reporting and research that AP labored to create.   
 For this same reason, the examination of the public 
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interest weighs against Meltwater.  Paraphrasing James Madison, 
the world is indebted to the press for triumphs which have been 
gained by reason and humanity over error and oppression.  
Investigating and writing about newsworthy events occurring 
around the globe is an expensive undertaking and enforcement of 
the copyright laws permits AP to earn the revenue that 
underwrites that work.  Permitting Meltwater to take the fruit 
of AP’s labor for its own profit, without compensating AP, 
injures AP’s ability to perform this essential function of 
democracy.    
 While commercial Internet news clipping services like 
Meltwater perform an important function for their clients, the 
public interest in the existence of such commercial enterprise 
does not outweigh the strong public interest in the enforcement 
of the copyright laws or justify allowing Meltwater to free ride 
on the costly news gathering and coverage work performed by 
other organizations.  Moreover, permitting Meltwater to avoid 
paying licensing fees gives it an unwarranted advantage over its 
competitors who do pay licensing fees.9
 As will be further explored below, Meltwater characterizes 
itself as an Internet search engine and emphasizes the 
importance of search engines to the operation of the Internet.  
   
                     
9 Meltwater has entered into very few licenses to obtain content.   
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Together, search engines and the Internet have delivered the 
world’s knowledge to the fingertips of multitudes across the 
globe.  There is a strong public interest in preserving this 
democratic, instantaneous, and efficient access to information.  
But, there is no necessary tension between these two important 
public goods:  news reporting and search engines.  Quite to the 
contrary, these interests are complementary.  The Internet would 
be far poorer if it were bereft of the reporting done by news 
organizations and both are enhanced by the accessibility the 
Internet provides to news gathered and delivered by news 
organizations.  Neither Meltwater nor its amici have shown that 
a finding that Meltwater’s activities do not amount to fair use 
threatens Internet search engines in any way.  For all of these 
reasons, the first factor in the fair use analysis decidedly 
favors AP.                 
 Meltwater’s argument that its use of the Registered 
Articles is transformative is premised on a single contention.  
It characterizes Meltwater News as a search engine that directs 
users to a source of information online and whose search results 
provide insight into “where, when, how often, and in what 
context” certain words or phrases appear on the Internet.  
Meltwater defines a search engine as a system that by design and 
operation improves access to information that is available on 
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the Internet.  According to Meltwater, the design and function 
of a search engine should decrease the likelihood that users 
would put the material displayed by the search engine to the 
same use as the original works.   
 But, as can be gleaned from the discussion of Meltwater’s 
operations in earlier sections of this Opinion, Meltwater’s own 
description of Internet search engines does not correspond to 
how Meltwater News itself functions.10  Meltwater News is an 
expensive subscription service that markets itself as a news 
clipping service, not as a publicly available tool to improve 
access to content across the Internet.  And, as further 
confirmation that Meltwater News is neither designed nor 
operated to improve access to the complete, linked news story, 
Meltwater has chosen not to offer evidence that Meltwater News 
customers actually use its service to improve their access to 
the underlying news stories that are excerpted in its news 
feed.11
                     
10 Relying on the publicly available filings in this case, the 
CCIA pointedly does not take a position on the ultimate question 
of whether Meltwater’s copying of expressive content created by 
AP is a fair use.  It simply asks the Court to take into account 
the effect that any ruling may have on the operation of 
“legitimate” online services.  That the Court has done. 
    
 
11 While Meltwater asserts that its U.S. subscribers clicked-
through to the underlying story millions of times during just 
the first six months of 2012, it has not placed that figure in 
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 As far as the thirty-three Registered Articles are 
concerned, customers rarely clicked-through to the underlying AP 
article.  It occurred just 0.08% of the time.  In her 
deposition, a Meltwater executive testified that a click-through 
rate of 0.05% would be consistent with her expectations.  The 
click-through rate for the thirty-three Registered Articles is 
also consistent with a UK tribunal’s finding that Meltwater’s 
services produced a click-through rate of 0.5% for certain UK 
news sources.12  Meltwater has not offered any evidence that this 
seemingly small click-through rate is equivalent to that 
experienced by any of the Internet search engines to which it 
compares itself.13
                                                                  
context by disclosing the rate of click-throughs that this 
number represents.  Moreover, it rebuffed AP’s repeated requests 
for data on click-through rates and as a result cannot fairly 
rely on this raw number.  
  While it might be more telling to learn what 
the click-through rate is for any single Meltwater News Report, 
rather than for a single article excerpted in a News Report, 
 
12 In litigation in Great Britain, the click-through rate was 
calculated during litigation over licensing fees to be paid for 
services rendered by media monitoring companies.  During the 
litigation, a Meltwater affiliate agreed to pay a web database 
license and lost its argument that it was unnecessary to have a 
license as well for end users of its service.  
13 Amici Curiae New York Times, et al., has referred to an 
article summarizing a 2010 report that found the click-though 
rate for Google News was 56%, a rate that the author of the 
article believed was probably an understatement.  See 
http://techcrunch.com/2010/01/19/outsell-google-news/. 
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Meltwater has not provided that information either.  Nor has it 
offered a comparison between the click-through rate for any 
single News Report and the rate for a single Google News search 
or any other search for news conducted through a recognized 
Internet search engine.14
 This was a conscious decision on Meltwater’s part.  During 
the discovery period, AP repeatedly requested additional data 
about Meltwater’s click-through rate in anticipation of any 
argument by Meltwater that Meltwater News directs traffic to the 
original websites for the news articles.  Meltwater took the 
position that the data was not relevant to these summary 
judgment motions and refused to provide this discovery.  The 
upshot is that Meltwater has no evidence that its system 
systematically drives its customers to third-party websites.  
  
 Instead of driving subscribers to third-party websites, 
Meltwater News acts as a substitute for news sites operated or 
licensed by AP.  Meltwater always reprints the story’s title and 
lede, as well as material surrounding one targeted keyword.  
Just as a news clipping service should do, Meltwater 
                     
14 In its Rule 56(d) motion, Meltwater has not suggested that it 
needs further discovery regarding click-through rates from third 
parties before these cross-motions for summary judgment may be 
decided.  Quite the contrary, in its own summary judgment 
motion, Meltwater takes the position that it is entitled to 
judgment on its fair use defense based on the record submitted. 
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systematically provides its subscribers with what in most 
instances will be the essence of the AP article relevant to that 
reader.15  And again, despite the obvious point of comparison 
given its characterization of itself as a search engine, 
Meltwater does not attempt to show that the extent of its taking 
from the copyrighted articles is no greater than that 
customarily done by search engines.  AP, in contrast, has 
offered evidence that Google News Alerts do not systematically 
include an article’s lede and are -- on average -- half the 
length of Meltwater’s excerpts.16
 Rather than offering any evidence from which to compare its 
actual performance with that of Internet search engines, 
Meltwater has chosen to rely on two decisions from the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals.  Meltwater argues from these two 
decisions that the extent of its copying of the underlying work 
is irrelevant to the fair use analysis since even the copying of 
the full work can be transformative when done by an Internet 
search engine.  Those two decisions, however, provide little 
   
                     
15 While not all of this content is expressive or protected by 
copyright law, Meltwater has not disputed that some portion of 
it is. 
 
16 The sample Google News Alert excerpts provided with this 
motion are on average roughly 207 characters long (not including 
white spaces).  
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comfort to Meltwater.      
    In Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th 
Cir. 2007), the Ninth Circuit vacated a preliminary injunction 
and held that Google was likely to succeed in showing at trial 
that the display of small images called “thumbnails,” which were 
reduced, lower-resolution versions of the plaintiff’s 
copyrighted photographs of nude models, on Google Image Search 
webpages was a fair use of the images.  Id. at 1154-55, 1168.  
The court found that Google’s use of thumbnails was “highly 
transformative” since its function was to serve as a pointer to 
a source of information rather than serving as a form of 
entertainment.  Id. at 1165.   
 Similarly, in Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th 
Cir. 2003), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that 
the display of small low-resolution pictures, again called 
thumbnails, on the website of an Internet search engine 
constituted a fair use of the plaintiff’s photographs of the 
American West.  Id. at 815.  The search engine in Kelly produced 
only thumbnails in response to a user’s query, and no text.  The 
court found that the use of the thumbnails was transformative 
because their use was “unrelated to any aesthetic purpose” since 
any enlargement “results in a significant loss of clarity of the 
image, making them inappropriate as display material.”  Id. at 
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818.  The display of thumbnails did not “stifle artistic 
creativity” or “supplant the need for the originals.”  Id. at 
820. 
 There are several distinctions to be drawn between the 
instant dispute and the issues at stake in Perfect 10 and Kelly.  
The first and most obvious is that it was undisputed in both 
cases that the fair use defense was being applied to a search 
engine engaged in a transformative purpose.  Unlike the searches 
in Perfect 10 and Kelly, Meltwater’s searches are not publicly 
available and are run against a defined list of content 
providers.  As already noted, Meltwater has also not offered 
evidence that it actually functions like a search engine in 
other important respects.  In short, use of an algorithm to 
crawl over and scrape content from the Internet is surely not 
enough to qualify as a search engine engaged in transformative 
work.    
 The second observation that should be made is that the two 
Ninth Circuit decisions on which Meltwater relies provide little 
support for its argument that the reprinting of the entirety of 
a copyrighted work is a fair use so long as the reprinting is 
done by a search engine.  The works at issue in the two Ninth 
Circuit decisions were photographs, which by their nature are 
indivisible.  Neither Perfect 10 nor Kelly can be fairly read to 
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support Meltwater’s claim that it is irrelevant how much of the 
Registered Articles it displayed in its search results.  By 
emphasizing the small size and low resolution of the thumbnails, 
the Ninth Circuit relied on the fact that the thumbnails could 
not substitute adequately for the copyrighted works.  If 
Meltwater captured and displayed the complete text of 
copyrighted news stories, it could no longer attempt to defend 
its business model as simply a search engine that aims to direct 
readers to the underlying story.   
 Moreover, Meltwater’s discussion of search engines is to 
some extent beside the point.  While it is important to 
understand how Meltwater News functions, even if it were a 
search engine it would still be necessary to examine whether 
Meltwater had acted to violate the Copyright Act.  The fact that 
Perfect 10 and Kelly addressed the issue of the fair use defense 
in the context of webpages created by a search engine, and found 
the defense available to those defendants, does not relieve 
Meltwater of its independent burden to prove that its specific 
display of search results for its subscribers qualifies as a 
fair use.  In other words, using the mechanics of search engines 
to scrape material from the Internet and provide it to consumers 
in response to their search requests does not immunize a 
defendant from the standards of conduct imposed by law through 
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the Copyright Act, including the statutory embodiment of the 
fair use defense.  
 By the same token, even though it could be said that a 
search engine merely “repackages” the original work, Infinity 
Broadcast Corp., 150 F.3d at 108 & n.2., and does not transform 
it in the sense of adding “new expression, meaning or message,” 
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579, that does not mean that its taking is 
ineligible for protection under the fair use defense.  Where a 
defendant’s use “is plainly different from the original purpose” 
for which the work was created, that use may be transformative.  
Bill Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 609 (approving reproduction of 
a small image of poster along a timeline in a biography).  As 
described by amici, the purpose of search engines is to allow 
users to sift through the deluge of data available through the 
Internet and to direct them to the original source.  That would 
appear to be a transformative purpose.  But, as discussed above, 
Meltwater has not shown that that is how it functions.     
 Based on the undisputed facts in this record, Meltwater 
provides the online equivalent to the traditional news clipping 
service.  Indeed, Meltwater has described itself as adding 
“game-changing technology for the traditional press clipping 
market.”  There is nothing transformative about that function.  
See, e.g., Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, 
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Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 199 (3d Cir. 2003) (clip previews of 
movies); Nihon, 166 F.3d at 72 (abstracts of news articles); 
Infinity Broadcast Corp., 150 F.3d at 108 (radio monitoring 
service); Los Angeles News Service v. Tullo, 973 F.2d 791, 797, 
799 (9th Cir. 1992) (video news clipping service.); Pacific and 
Southern Co., Inc. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1496 (11th Cir. 
1984) (TV news clipping service).   
 Finally, Meltwater seeks to defend its copying of the 
Registered Articles by pointing out that it used the content it 
takes from the Internet to also provide its subscribers with 
services like Dashboard Analytics.  Meltwater argues that this 
use of the material constitutes a transformative use.  This 
lawsuit does not challenge the display of any of Meltwater's 
analytics to its subscribers.  AP has not argued that the 
analysis of its publicly available content through these tools 
violates it rights.  The display of that analysis -- whether it 
be a graphic display of geographic distribution of coverage or 
tone or any other variable included by Meltwater -- is an 
entirely separate service, however, from the publishing of 
excerpts from copyrighted articles.  The fact that Meltwater 
also offers a number of analysis tools does not render its 
copying and redistribution of article excerpts transformative.  
In sum, the purpose and character of Meltwater’s use of AP’s 
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articles weigh against a finding of fair use.   
B. Nature of the Copyrighted Work 
The second factor -– the nature of the copyrighted work -- 
considers principally two characteristics of the copyrighted 
work.  First, this factor calls for consideration of “whether 
the work is expressive or creative, such as a work of fiction, 
or more factual.”  Blanch, 467 F.3d at 256 (citation omitted).  
Works of fiction are “closer to the core of intended copyright 
protection” than are works that are predominantly factual.  
Infinity Broadcast Corp., 150 F.3d at 109 (citation omitted).  
Accordingly, the scope of fair use is broader with respect to 
factual works than it is with respect to works of fiction.  See 
Nihon, 166 F.3d at 73.   
The second characteristic of the copyrighted work that is 
relevant to this factor is whether the work is published or 
unpublished.  The right of first publication is an important 
right held by the copyright owner and “the scope of fair use is 
narrower with respect to unpublished works.”  Wright v. Warner 
Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 737 (2d Cir. 1991) (citation 
omitted). 
AP’s articles are news stories and therefore more 
vulnerable to application of the fair use defense than works of 
fiction.  Moreover, Meltwater copied works that were already 
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published.  As a consequence, this factor “is at most neutral on 
the question of fair use,” Nihon, 166 F.3d at 73, and should be 
weighed in favor of finding fair use.   
C. Amount and Substantiality of the Copying 
The third factor examines the amount and substantiality of 
the copying by the infringing work.  This factor has both 
quantitative and qualitative dimensions, NXIVM Corp. v. the Ross 
Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 480 (2d Cir. 2004), and is reviewed “with 
reference to the copyrighted work, not the infringing work.”  
Wright, 953 F.2d at 738.   
The quantitative assessment examines the portion of the 
copyrighted work that was taken in relation to the whole of that 
work.  The qualitative dimension of this factor considers the 
importance of the expressive components of the portion copied.  
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 587; see also Rogers v. Koons, 960 
F.2d 301, 311 (2d Cir. 1992).  In other words, the court should 
consider whether the portion taken is “essentially the heart” of 
the copyrighted expression.  NXIVM Corp., 364 F.3d at 480 
(citation omitted).  The “most relevant” question for this 
factor is whether the infringer has taken “no more” than is 
necessary.  Infinity Broadcast Corp., 150 F.3d at 110.  
In terms of quantitative copying, the Second Circuit has 
found that copying as little as eight percent of the original 
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work may tip this factor against a finding of fair use.  Iowa 
State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Co., 621 F.2d 
57, 61-62 (2d Cir. 1980) (broadcasting of eight percent of 
student-made film); see also Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 
F.2d 90, 98 (2d Cir. 1987) (copying one-third of seventeen 
letters and ten percent of forty-two letters weighed against 
finding of fair use).  It is clear, however, that no bright-line 
rule exists with respect to how much copying is too much.  New 
Era Publ’ns Intern., ApS v. Carol Publ’g Group, 904 F.2d 152, 
158 (2d Cir. 1990).  Thus, in other cases, copying up to eight 
percent of an original work is not inconsistent with fair use.  
Id. (eight percent); Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 
1253, 1263 (2d Cir. 1986) (4.3 percent).  Indeed, while 
appropriation of a copyrighted work in its entirety weighs 
against a finding of fair use, where a work is indivisible it is 
not an absolute bar to such a finding.  See Bill Graham 
Archives, 448 F.3d at 613 (image of poster).   At the same time, 
relatively small takings may be significant if the portions 
taken are qualitatively important.  Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 
564-65 (copying of 300 words of biography held substantial where 
copied portion was “essentially the heart of the book”).   
The reasonableness of the amount and portions copied will 
vary depending on the character and purpose of the secondary 
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use.  It may be necessary for the secondary user to copy a 
certain amount or specific portion of the original work in order 
to accomplish the transformative purpose.  The Supreme Court’s 
analysis in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994), 
is instructive.  In that case, a rap group -- 2 Live Crew -- 
sampled portions of Roy Orbison and William Dees’ song “Oh, 
Pretty Woman” in a rap parody entitled “Pretty Woman.”  Id. at 
572.  In considering the amount and substantiality of the 
copying, the Supreme Court offered the following analysis: 
When parody takes aim at a particular work, the parody 
must be able to ‘conjure up’ at least enough of that 
original to make the object of its critical wit 
recognizable.  What makes for this recognition is 
quotation of the original’s most distinctive or 
memorable features, which the parodist can be sure 
that audience will know.  Once enough has been taken 
to assure identification, how much more is reasonable 
will depend, say, on the extent to which the song’s 
overriding purpose and character is to parody the 
original or, in contrast, the likelihood that the 
parody may serve as a market substitute for the 
original.  
 
Id. at 588 (citation omitted).  An analysis of this factor may 
offer insight into the fourth factor of the fair use analysis as 
well.  In effect, the substantiality of the copying may 
foreshadow the extent to which the second work will be capable 
of serving as a market substitute for the original work.  Id. at 
587.     
 This factor weighs strongly against a finding of fair use 
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here.  Meltwater has not shown that its taking from the 
Registered Articles was defensible from either a quantitative or 
qualitative perspective.   
 Meltwater took between 4.5% and 61% of the Registered 
Articles.  It automatically took the lede from every AP story.  
As described by AP’s Standards Editor, the lede is “meant to 
convey the heart of the story.”  A lede is a sentence that takes 
significant journalistic skill to craft.  There is no other 
single sentence from an AP story that is as consistently 
important from article to article –- neither the final sentence 
nor any sentence that begins any succeeding paragraph in the 
story.  
 Nor has Meltwater attempted to show that it took no more 
than necessary to perform as a search engine, which is how it 
seeks to justify its infringement.  It has not offered evidence 
that its automated programs for culling and displaying passages 
from articles are consistent with the industry standards for 
search engines.  As the evidence offered on this motion 
illustrates, search engines regularly display briefer segments 
of news articles.  As the CCIA describes the segments taken by 
search engines, they are no more than “a headline and a snippet 
of context” designed to direct users to the original source.  
Indeed, in its foreign operations, it is undisputed that 
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Meltwater provides its customers with far less material than it 
provides in the United States.  In Canada it delivers only 
headlines, and in the United Kingdom its excerpts are far 
shorter. 
 Meltwater makes essentially three arguments to support its 
infringement under the third factor’s quantitative and 
qualitative tests.  None of these arguments is persuasive.   
 First, Meltwater relies on Nihon, 166 F.3d at 65, to argue 
that its taking was not quantitatively significant.  In Nihon, 
the Second Circuit found, although acknowledging that it was a 
“close call,” that the copying of only one paragraph of a six-
paragraph news article was not an act of infringement since the 
two articles were not substantially similar in a “quantitative 
sense.”  Id. at 71.  Since Meltwater has not chosen, however, to 
contest AP’s showing that its copying of each of the Registered 
Articles was an act of infringement, the Nihon court’s 
discussion about the substantial similarity test for 
infringement has limited relevance here.  In any event, when it 
reached the fair use defense, the Nihon court found that the 
abstracting of news articles by the defendant was not a fair use 
of those articles.  In connection with the third factor, it 
emphasized the amount of copying of protectable expression and 
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held that this factor also tipped against fair use.  Id. at 73.17
 Next, Meltwater argues that the extent of its copying is 
justified because its purpose is to serve as a search engine.  
But, Meltwater has failed to show that it takes only that amount 
of material from AP’s articles that is necessary for it to 
function as a search engine.  Indeed, the evidence is 
compellingly to the contrary. 
  
 Finally, Meltwater disagrees that the lede is qualitatively 
significant.  It points out that two of the ledes are teasers 
and not summaries of news.18
D. The Effect of the Use on the Potential Market or Value 
of the Work 
  This observation misses the mark.  
If anything, the observation emphasizes the creativity and 
therefore protected expression involved with writing a lede and 
the skill required to tweak a reader’s interest.   
 
The final fair use factor is multi-faceted.  It  
requires courts to consider not only the extent of 
market harm caused by the particular actions of the 
alleged infringer, but also whether unrestricted and 
                     
17 In Nihon, the court found that the average abstract used two-
thirds of the protectable material, using the same structure and 
organization of facts.  166 F.3d at 71. 
 
18 Meltwater quotes the following two ledes:  “When Emily 
Russell’s two young sons wake up on Christmas morning, they’ll 
find that Santa left them a note instead of the videogames they 
requested;” and “To much of the nation, Ted Stevens was the 
crotchety senator who famously referred to the Internet as ‘a 
series of tubes’ and fought to build the ‘Bridge to Nowhere.’”    
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widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the 
defendant would result in a substantially adverse 
impact on the potential market for the original.  
 
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590 (citation omitted).  Where there is a 
fully functioning market for the infringer’s use of the 
copyrighted material, it will be difficult for the infringing 
party to show that it made fair use without paying a licensing 
fee.  See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566 n.9.  In contrast, “when 
the only possible adverse effect occasioned by the secondary use 
would be to a potential market or value that the copyright 
holder has not typically sought to, or reasonably been able to, 
obtain or capture,” this fourth factor will favor the infringer.  
Am. Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 930.  But, again, because fair 
use is an affirmative defense, it is the defendant’s burden to 
present evidence of relevant markets that is favorable to its 
defense.  Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590; Infinity Broadcast Corp., 
150 F.3d at 110.       
When analyzing the fourth factor, “the impact on potential 
licensing revenues is a proper subject for consideration.”  Am. 
Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 929.  In considering this type of 
harm, however, a court must be wary of falling into the trap of 
circular reasoning.  The Second Circuit has provided the 
following guidance: 
[I]t is not unsound to conclude that the right to seek 
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payment for a particular use tends to become legally 
cognizable under the fourth fair use factor when the 
means for paying for such a use is made easier.  This 
notion is not inherently troubling: it is sensible 
that a particular unauthorized use should be 
considered more fair when there is no ready market or 
means to pay for the use, while such an unauthorized 
use should be considered less fair when there is a 
ready market or means to pay for the use.  The vice of 
circular reasoning arises only if the availability of 
payment is conclusive against fair use. 
 
Id. at 930-31.  Thus, in order to prevent the loss of licensing 
fees from becoming a syllogistic consideration, courts consider 
only the loss to potential licensing revenues from “traditional, 
reasonable, or likely to be developed markets.”  Id. at 930; see 
also Bill Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 614.     
Consequently, when the use is transformative or takes place 
in a market that the copyright holder is unlikely to develop, it 
is more likely that the defendant has engaged in a fair use of 
the material.  After all, “[c]opyright holders rarely write 
parodies of their own works, or write reviews of them, and are 
even less likely to write news analyses of their underlying data 
from the opposite political perspective.”  Twin Peaks Products, 
Inc. v. Publ’ns Intern LTD, 996 F.2d 1366, 1377 (2d Cir. 1993) 
(citation omitted); cf. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592-93.  
Accordingly, while a copyright holder’s current participation in 
a given market is relevant to the determination of whether the 
market is “traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed,” 
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it is not determinative.   
[A] copyright holder cannot prevent others from 
entering fair use markets merely by developing or 
licensing a market for parody, news reporting, 
educational or other transformative uses of its own 
creative work. 
   
Bill Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 614-15 (citation omitted).  In 
other words, “[c]opyright owners may not preempt exploitation of 
transformative markets.”  Id. at 615 (citation omitted).  
Additionally, this factor requires careful attention to the 
source or cause of the harm.   
If the harm resulted from a transformative secondary 
use that lowered the public’s estimation of the 
original (such as a devastating review of a book that 
quotes liberally from the original to show how silly 
and poorly written it is), this transformative use 
will be found to be a fair use, notwithstanding the 
harm. 
   
On Davis, 246 F.3d at 175.  The concern of this factor is not 
with “whether the secondary use suppresses or even destroys the 
market for the original work or its potential derivatives, but 
[with] whether the secondary use usurps or substitutes for the 
market of the original.”  Castle Rock Entm’t, 150 F.3d at 145. 
 The fourth factor weighs strongly against Meltwater.  AP 
has expended considerable effort to develop an on-line presence.  
Among other things, it licenses its content to media monitoring 
services that live in the very commercial space in which 
Meltwater resides.  By refusing to pay a licensing fee to AP, 
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Meltwater not only deprives AP of a licensing fee in an 
established market for AP’s work, but also cheapens the value of 
AP’s work by competing with companies that do pay a licensing 
fee to use AP content in the way that Meltwater does.  The value 
of AP’s work is further harmed by the fact that Meltwater 
directly competes with AP for customers.  Through its use of AP 
content and refusal to pay a licensing fee, Meltwater has 
obtained an unfair commercial advantage in the marketplace and 
directly harmed the creator of expressive content protected by 
the Copyright Act. 
 Meltwater ignores most of this record.  It relies almost 
exclusively on its contentions that it is a search engine and 
that search engines make a transformative use of the copyrighted 
news stories.  But, as discussed above, AP has not shown that it 
should be characterized as a search engine imbued with a 
transformative purpose; adopting technology used by search 
engines does not by itself make one a search engine in this 
sense.  As tellingly, Meltwater has not shown that it has taken 
only that amount of content that is necessary for it to function 
as a search engine. 
E. Aggregate Assessment of the Fair Use Factors   
 Examining the four factors individually, and considering 
them as a whole in light of the purposes of the Copyright Act 
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and the fair use defense, Meltwater has failed to raise a 
material question of fact to support its fair use defense.  
Meltwater’s business model relies on the systematic copying of 
protected expression and the sale of collections of those copies 
in reports that compete directly with the copyright owner and 
that owner’s licensees and that deprive that owner of a stream 
of income to which it is entitled.  Meltwater’s News Reports 
gather and deliver news coverage to its subscribers.  It is a 
classic news clipping service.  This is not a transformative 
use.  As significantly, the rejection of the fair use defense 
here will further the ultimate aim of the Copyright Act, which 
is to stimulate the creation of useful works for the public 
good.  Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558. 
 Throughout its discussion of the fair use defense, 
Meltwater has attempted to escape the straight forward 
application of the four-part fair use test by characterizing 
itself as a search engine.  Meltwater has failed to show, 
however, that its interactions with its subscribers are 
equivalent in any material way to the functioning of search 
engines, as that term is commonly understood.  Exploitation of 
search engine technology to gather content does not answer the 
question of whether the business itself functions as a search 
engine.  In any event, however Meltwater’s business is 
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classified, it must still show that its use of copyrighted 
expressive content was a fair use.  This it has not done.      
II. Implied License 
 AP has also moved for summary judgment on Meltwater’s 
second affirmative defense, the defense that Meltwater was 
granted an implied license by AP.  It is a defense to copyright 
infringement that the alleged infringer possessed a license to 
use the copyrighted work.  Graham v. James, 144 F.3d 229, 236 
(2d Cir. 1998).  The burden of proving that a license exists 
falls on the party invoking the defense.  Id.    
 Pursuant to the Copyright Act, all grants of exclusive 
rights in a copyright must be made in writing.  17 U.S.C. § 
204(a).  Nonexclusive licenses, however, need not be in writing.  
17 U.S.C. § 101; see also MacLean Assocs. Inc. v. VM. M. Mercer-
Medinger-Hansen, Inc., 952 F.2d 769, 778-79 (3d Cir. 1991).  
Thus, a nonexclusive license can be granted orally or it can be 
implied from conduct.  See MacLean Assocs., 952 F.2d at 778-79.  
As the Supreme Court explained in De Forest Radio Telephone & 
Telegraph v. United States, 273 U.S. 236 (1927), in the course 
of deciding whether a company had given a license to the United 
States to manufacture a product covered by patents: 
No formal granting of a license is necessary in order 
to give it effect.  Any language used by the owner of 
the patent or any conduct on his part exhibited to 
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another, from which that other may properly infer that 
the owner consents to his use of the patent in making 
or using it, or selling it, upon which the other acts, 
constitutes a license, and a defense to an action for 
a tort. 
 
Id. at 241.   
 The test for determining whether an implied license exists 
in the copyright context has three elements.  The defendant must 
show that 
 (1) the licensee requested the creation of a work;  
(2) the licensor made that particular work and delivered it 
to the licensee who requested it; and  
(3) the licensor intended that the licensee copy and 
distribute his work.  
See Latimer v. Roaring Toyz, Inc., 601 F.3d 1224, 1235 (11th 
Cir. 2010); see also Wilchombe v. TeeVee Tonns, Inc., 555 F.3d 
949, 956 (11th Cir. 2009); Atkins v. Fischer, 331 F.3d 988, 991-
92 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Nelson-Salabes, Inc. v. Morningside 
Development, LLC, 284 F.3d 505, 514 (4th Cir. 2002); I.A.E. Inc. 
v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 1996).  The circumstances 
in which an implied license may be found are therefore quite 
“narrow.”  SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare v. Watson 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 211 F.3d 21, 25 (2d Cir. 2000) (citation 
omitted).   
 Even those courts that do not require evidence of each of 
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these three elements do require evidence of a meeting of the 
minds between the licensor and licensee such that it is fair to 
infer that the licensor intended to grant a nonexclusive 
license.  Baisden v. I’m Ready Prods., Inc., 693 F.3d 491, 501 
(5th Cir. 2012) (collecting cases); see also Psihoyos v. Pearson 
Educ. Inc., 855 F.Supp.2d 103, 124 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).  Since an 
implied license is a creature of contract law, the parties’ 
intent is a critical factor.  I.A.E., 74 F.3d at 775-76; see 
also Johnson v. Jones, 149 F.3d 494, 502 (6th Cir. 1998).      
Meltwater has failed to offer evidence from which a 
reasonable juror could conclude that AP impliedly granted 
Meltwater a license to copy and distribute its articles.  It is 
undisputed that the Registered Articles were not created at 
Meltwater’s request.  Moreover, the parties had essentially no 
contact with each other before this litigation.19
Meltwater has not shown that it had the type of interaction 
  As a result, 
Meltwater is unable to point to any interaction with AP from 
which it could be inferred that there was a meeting of minds 
between the parties that AP was granting Meltwater a 
nonexclusive license to extract and re-publish excerpts of its 
news stories that appeared on the Internet.   
                     
19 Meltwater insists that the parties had no contact in 2009, 
2010, or 2011, while AP contends there was “a casual” exchange 
between the parties in January 2011.   
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with AP that existed in any of those few instances in which 
Courts of Appeals across the country have found evidence of an 
implied license.  See, e.g. Lukens Steel Co. v. Am. Locomotive 
Co., 197 F.2d 939, 941 (2d Cir. 1952) (the parties “were engaged 
in business relationship involving mutual confidence and mutual 
effort”); Atkins, 331 F.3d at 990 (parties had formal agreement 
under which appellant would create designs for appellees’ 
product); I.A.E., 74 F.3d at 771-72, 776 (architect prepared 
schematic design drawings at company’s request and delivered 
copies to company).     
Nor has Meltwater offered any evidence of interaction with 
any of AP’s licensees from which it could be inferred that any 
one of those licensees had impliedly granted a sublicense to 
Meltwater to excerpt material found on their websites.  This is 
unsurprising since AP’s licenses do not grant its licensees the 
authority to sublicense AP content.     
In its opposition, Meltwater makes one argument to support 
its affirmative defense of implied license.  It once again 
equates its activities with those of a search engine that makes 
its searches freely available to the public in order to direct 
the Internet user to the websites that respond to the user’s 
search requests.  Meltwater argues that AP impliedly granted 
Meltwater a license to use the Registered Articles when it did 
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not require its licensees to employ on their websites robots.txt 
protocol to exclude web crawlers.20
Meltwater has not offered any expert testimony about 
robots.txt, but the parties appear to agree that it functions as 
follows.  Robots.txt protocol, also known as the Robot Exclusion 
Standard, was designed by industry groups to instruct 
cooperating web crawlers not to access all or part of a website 
that is publicly viewable.  If a website owner uses the 
robots.txt file to give instructions about its site to web 
crawlers, and a crawler honors the instruction, then the crawler 
should not visit any pages on the website.  The protocol can 
also be used to instruct web crawlers to avoid just a portion of 
the website that is segregated into a separate directory.   
   
For several reasons, the failure of AP’s licensees to 
employ the robots.txt protocol did not give Meltwater an implied 
license to copy and publish AP content.  First, what Meltwater 
is suggesting would shift the burden to the copyright holder to 
prevent unauthorized use instead of placing the burden on the 
infringing party to show it had properly taken and used content. 
                     
20 Meltwater makes this argument with respect to AP licensees 
alone, but Meltwater’s argument would seemingly apply with equal 
force to AP’s own websites.  Applying Meltwater’s reasoning, AP 
itself would have to adopt a robots.txt protocol to limit the 
access of web crawlers to its own websites or be deemed to have 
granted them an implied license.   
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As significantly, there is no fair inference, based simply 
on the absence of the robots.txt protocol, that there has been a 
meeting of the minds between the copyright owner and the owner 
of the web crawler about the extent of copying.  The implied 
license that Meltwater is advocating would reach to every web 
crawler with no distinction between those who make fair use and 
those who do not, or between those whose uses may be publicly 
observed and those whose uses are hidden within closed, 
subscriber systems.  Meltwater has presented no evidence to 
suggest that robots.txt instructions are capable of 
communicating which types of use the copyright holder is 
permitting the web crawler to make of the content or the extent 
of the copying the copyright holder will allow.   
There are also practical problems with Meltwater’s argument 
in the event that AP and its licensees wanted to continue to 
permit search engines to visit their sites.  AP is engaged in an 
ongoing licensing program that includes granting licenses that 
permit the scraping of AP content by web crawlers from online 
sources.  Robots.txt protocol can be adopted to allow or 
disallow specific web crawlers.  If Meltwater’s argument were 
successful, with each change in the list of licensees AP and 
each of its licensees would have to update their robots.txt 
protocol to indicate which web crawlers had permission to visit 
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each site’s webpages.21
There is yet another policy reason against the use of 
robots.txt protocol to enforce the Copyright Act.  The protocol 
is a helpful innovation that gives instructions to cooperating 
crawlers.  But, in the interest of openness on the Internet, one 
would expect it to be used only when it is in the clear interest 
of the website to broadly limit access.  It is fair to assume 
that most Internet users (and many owners of websites) would 
like crawlers employed by search engines to visit as many 
websites as possible, to include those websites in their search 
results, and thereby to direct viewers to a vast array of sites.  
Adopting Meltwater’s position would require websites concerned 
about improper copying to signal crawlers that they are not 
welcome.     
   
 Finally, in support of its argument, Meltwater cites Field 
v. Google, 412 F.Supp.2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006), and Parker v. 
Yahoo!, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 2757, 2008 WL 4410095 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 
25, 2008).  Neither decision suggests that AP impliedly 
                     
21 While the robots.txt protocol could work precisely the 
opposite way, that is, to indicate that every web crawler is 
permitted access except for those for whom permission is denied, 
it is difficult to envision how a website could effectively 
manage a program that requires it to keep an accurate list of 
all crawlers who are roaming the web and for whom permission is 
being denied.  Meltwater has reserved the right, however, to 
ignore an exclusion list that lists it.  
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consented to the copying done by Meltwater because its licensees 
permitted search engines to crawl their sites.  These two 
decisions principally discuss a website protocol that performs a 
different function than robots.txt.  They address the storage of 
web pages by search engines.  The “cached” pages at issue 
allowed users of the search engines to access an archival copy 
of a webpage stored in the search engine’s system.  The archival 
copy shows the page as it appeared the last time the search 
engine visited the page.  Field, 412 F.Supp.2d at 1111.  This 
can be particularly useful when a page has been removed from its 
original location.  Id.  By adopting a “no-archive” meta-tag, 
the website owner could instruct the search engines not to 
provide a cached link to search engine users.  Id. at 1112-13.  
The copyright owners in each of these decisions chose not to use 
the “no-archive” meta-tags, knew that the search engines would 
honor the meta-tags, and also knew the search engines would 
remove the cached copy upon request.  In such circumstances, the 
courts found an implied license.  Id. at 1116; Parker, 2008 WL 
4410095, at *4.   
Meltwater does not provide its subscribers with access to 
cached pages, reserves the right to disregard certain robots.txt 
instructions, and has not suggested that it will remove content 
from its system at the request of the copyright owner.  As a 
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result, these two decisions have limited relevance.       
It is worth observing that, when a crawler is making a fair 
use of a website's content, it does not need to resort to the 
implied license doctrine; where it does not, then the website's 
failure to use the robots.txt protocol to block its access will 
not create an implied license.  Accordingly, Meltwater’s implied 
license defense fails as a matter of law.22
III. Equitable Estoppel 
 
Meltwater relies on three additional affirmative defenses 
as reasons why summary judgment may not be entered in favor of 
AP on its copyright infringement claim.  The first is equitable 
estoppel. 
Meltwater argues that AP is estopped from bringing its 
                     
22 Although Meltwater has not moved for summary judgment on its 
affirmative defense of an implied license, it has argued that 
the evidence presented in connection with these summary judgment 
motions “establishes” its implied license “as a matter of law.”  
Nonetheless, it makes one request pursuant to Rule 56(d) in the 
event the Court disagrees and believes that AP's motion has 
merit.  Meltwater contends that it needs discovery of AP's 
internal documents that discuss the “viability” of robots.txt.  
This argument does not prevent an entry of summary judgment for 
AP.  Meltwater never mentioned the phrase “robots.txt” in any of 
its document requests of AP or in any application to the Court 
for additional discovery.  It had a full opportunity to take 
discovery of AP on this issue and every other issue related to 
this summary judgment motion and may not prevent entry of 
summary judgment for AP through this belated request.  In any 
event, discovery of AP’s internal deliberations regarding the 
robots.txt protocol would have no impact on the decision reached 
above.   
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claim of copyright infringement because it failed to take 
protective measures and was silent in the face of Meltwater’s 
actions.  This defense is no more effective than Meltwater's 
affirmative defense of implied license. 
The doctrine of equitable estoppel applies “where the 
enforcement of the rights of one party would work an injustice 
upon the other party due to the latter’s justifiable reliance 
upon the former’s words or conduct.”  Marvel Characters, Inc. v. 
Simon, 310 F.3d 280, 292 (2d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).  
Essential to any finding of estoppel is “detrimental reliance on 
the adverse party’s misrepresentations.”  Republic of Ecuador v. 
Chevron Corp., 638 F.3d 384, 400 (2d Cir. 2011).  Reliance is 
not justifiable if the party invoking estoppel “had the means by 
which with reasonable diligence he could acquire the knowledge 
so that it would be negligence on his part to remain ignorant by 
not using those means.”  In re Becker, 407 F.3d 89, 99 (2d Cir. 
2005) (citation omitted) (Emphasis omitted.)  Silence alone is 
rarely a basis for finding equitable estoppel, but “where a 
party has a legal duty to speak, silence can constitute an 
affirmative ‘misrepresentation.’”  Kosakow v. New Rochelle 
Radiology Assocs., P.C., 274 F.3d 706, 725 (2d Cir. 2001); see 
also Veltri v. Bldg 32B-J Pension Fund, 393 F.3d 318, 326 (2d 
Cir. 2004); General Elec. Capital Corp. v. Armadora, S.A., 37 
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F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 1994).  
Meltwater has not carried its burden of raising a question 
of fact suggesting that AP made any misrepresentations or acted 
in any way that would have justified Meltwater believing that it 
was entitled to publish the excerpts from the Registered 
Articles or would not be sued for copyright infringement if it 
did.  Meltwater has not pointed to any representation by AP or 
its licensees that led it to believe that it could act as it did 
in publishing the excerpts of AP articles.  To the contrary, 
many if not all of AP’s licensees display terms of use on their 
websites prohibiting the commercial use of content.23
 Meltwater relies instead on two omissions by AP to support 
its affirmative defense of equitable estoppel.  The first is 
that AP did not restrict general access to its online content by 
  Nor has 
Meltwater shown that it acted with the diligence required to 
assert this defense.  Indeed, Meltwater has not offered any 
evidence that it actually held the belief that AP had authorized 
it to publish the excerpts it took from AP online articles.   
                     
23 AP has offered examples of the terms of use found on a number 
of AP’s licensees’ websites.  Meltwater objects that AP has not 
demonstrated that these terms of use were present on the 
licensees’ websites during the time period in which Meltwater 
scraped articles from those websites.  It is undisputed, 
however, that in at least one instance, Meltwater had knowledge 
of a website’s terms of use prohibiting commercial use of the 
website’s content and nonetheless scraped an AP article from 
that website a month later. 
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requiring its licensees to put AP content behind a paywall, 
require registration for access, or use robots.txt instructions 
to signal that AP content was off-limits.  AP had no duty to 
take any of these steps before it could act to enforce its 
rights against copyright infringement.  No infringer of AP’s 
copyright could reasonably rely on the absence of these measures 
to excuse infringement.  
Meltwater next argues that, until it initiated this 
lawsuit, AP never told Meltwater that it had any objection to 
Meltwater’s use of AP content.  But, Meltwater has offered no 
evidence of any relationship or communication with AP that 
imposed upon AP the duty to speak.  In the absence of a duty to 
speak, Meltwater could not reasonably rely on AP’s alleged 
silence about its copyright infringement.  
Not only has Meltwater failed to offer evidence of any 
justifiable reliance, but the evidence submitted on these 
motions also indicates that Meltwater was on notice of the risk 
it ran of being sued by AP for copyright infringement.  As 
mentioned, many -- if not all -- of the websites that Meltwater 
crawled in order to copy AP articles post terms of use that 
specifically prohibit commercial use of the website’s content. 
In October of 2007, AP sued one of Meltwater’s competitors -- 
Moreover Technologies, Inc. (“Moreover”) -- for copyright 
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infringement on the basis of Moreover’s scraping of AP content 
from websites and distribution of excerpts or entire articles to 
Moreover’s customers.24
IV. Laches 
  In April 2009, AP issued a press release 
describing its launch of an industry initiative to protect news 
content from online misappropriation.  Later that year, AP 
announced that an initiative to monitor the use of AP’s content 
online had been created.  Had Meltwater been reasonably diligent 
in acquiring knowledge about AP’s views on the commercial 
redistribution of its content, it could not have remained 
ignorant of the true facts.  Meltwater has failed, therefore, to 
show that the doctrine of equitable estoppel prevents the entry 
of summary judgment in favor of AP. 
Meltwater also argues that its affirmative defense of 
laches prevents summary judgment from being granted in AP’s 
favor.  The Copyright Act sets a three-year statute of 
limitations for copyright infringement claims.  17 U.S.C. § 
507(b).  A copyright claim accrues “when a plaintiff knows or 
has reason to know of the injury upon which the claim is 
                     
24 Meltwater objects to the evidence of AP’s complaint against 
Moreover on the ground that it constitutes inadmissible hearsay.  
The complaint has not been received for the truth of the matters 
asserted.  Instead it has been received as evidence of 
Meltwater’s notice that AP was unlikely to consider Meltwater’s 
actions authorized. 
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premised.”  Merchant v. Levy, 92 F.3d 51, 56 (2d Cir. 1996).  
When the copyright claim is based on infringement, the “action 
may be commenced within three years of any infringing act, 
regardless of any prior acts of infringement.”  Kwan v. Schlein, 
634 F.3d 224, 228 (2d Cir. 2011).  The parties agree that the 
plaintiff’s copyright infringement claims with respect to the 
Registered Articles were filed within the three-year statute of 
limitations.   
The defendant claims that while the statute of limitations 
may not bar the plaintiff’s claims, the doctrine of laches does.  
The doctrine of laches is derived from the equitable principle 
that “equity aids only the vigilant, and not those who sleep on 
their rights.”  Ivani Contracting Corp. v. City of New York, 103 
F.3d 257, 259 (2d Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).  The doctrine 
of laches has three elements: “(1) the plaintiff knew of the 
defendant’s misconduct; (2) the plaintiff inexcusably delayed in 
taking action; and (3) the defendant was prejudiced by the 
delay.”  Ikelionwu v. United States, 150 F.3d 223, 237 (2d Cir. 
1998) (laches applied to request for return of seized property).  
There is disagreement among the Circuits regarding whether 
laches is a viable defense to a copyright claim brought within 
the three-year statute of limitation.  See Petrella v. Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 695 F.3d 946, 958 (9th Cir. 2012) 
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(Fletcher, J., concurring) (describing the circuit split).  In 
the Second Circuit, “[t]he prevailing rule” in the context of a 
federal statutory claim seeking legal relief, is one in which 
“laches cannot bar that claim, at least where the statute 
contains an express limitations period within which the action 
is timely.”  Ivani Contracting Corp., 103 F.3d at 260.  Even in 
the context of an action in equity, the doctrine of laches will 
rarely be applied within this circuit to an action brought 
within the statutory period.  Ikelionwu, 150 F.3d at 238.  
Nonetheless, severe prejudice coupled with unconscionable delay 
may limit injunctive relief in a copyright action.  New Era 
Publ’ns, 873 F.2d at 584-85. 
Accordingly, laches is not a defense to the plaintiff’s 
claim for damages.  Laches is also not available to Meltwater as 
a defense to copyright infringement to the extent AP seeks 
prospective injunctive relief.  See Peter Letterese and Assocs. 
Inc., 533 F.3d at 1321.  Equitable considerations -- like laches 
-- may arise, however, where a plaintiff seeks retrospective 
injunctive relief and can demonstrate each of the traditional 
elements of the laches defense.  See New Era Publ’ns, 873 F.2d 
at 584.   
 In its amended complaint, AP seeks both damages and 
injunctive relief.  In terms of injunctive relief, AP seeks both 
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prospective relief and an order requiring Meltwater to “delete 
from its database and all computers under Defendants’ control 
all copyrighted materials owned by AP and all AP news reports.”  
Should Meltwater carry its burden of showing laches, it would at 
most be able to bar AP's request that AP’s content be swept from 
Meltwater's databases.  The parties will be given an additional 
opportunity to address whether retrospective injunctive relief 
should be granted in this case. 
V. Copyright Misuse 
As its fifth and final affirmative defense to AP’s 
copyright infringement claims, Meltwater argues that AP should 
be barred from enforcing its copyrights because -- by engaging 
in price-fixing with competing news organizations in violation 
of the antitrust laws -- it has misused its copyrights.  This 
final defense fails as well. 
The Second Circuit has not yet recognized the affirmative 
defense of copyright misuse.  See Shady Records v. Source 
Enters., 03 Civ. 9944 (GEL), 2005 WL 14920, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 3, 2005).  Although copyright misuse has been acknowledged 
as a potential affirmative defense to an action for copyright 
infringement in at least five circuits, only a handful of 
decisions have ever applied it to bar an otherwise successful 
claim of copyright infringement.  See Video Pipeline, 342 F.3d 
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at 206 (recognizing defense but finding no misuse); Alcatel USA, 
Inc. v. DGI Technologies, Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 795 (5th Cir. 
1999) (plaintiff’s copyright misuse barred it from obtaining 
injunctive relief on its copyright infringement claim); Practice 
Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Assoc., 121 F.3d 516, 521 (9th 
Cir. 1997) (reversing award of damages and injunction for 
copyright infringement because of plaintiff’s copyright misuse); 
Lasercomb Am. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 979 (4th Cir. 1990) 
(reversing award of damages and injunction for copyright 
infringement due to plaintiff’s copyright misuse); United 
Telephone Co. of Missouri v. Johnson Pub. Co., Inc., 855 F.2d 
604, 612 (8th Cir. 1988) (assuming defense exists but finding no 
misuse). 
The defense of copyright misuse arises from the better-
known defense of patent misuse described in Morton Salt Co. v. 
G.S. Suppiger, 314 U.S. 488 (1942).  In Morton Salt, the patent 
holder for the design of a salt-depositing machine also produced 
salt tablets.  Morton Salt entered into licensing agreements 
that required its licensees to use Morton salt tablets 
exclusively.  When Morton Salt brought suit for patent 
infringement, the Supreme Court found that its suit was barred 
by its use of its “patent monopoly to restrain competition in 
the marketing of unpatented articles.”  Id. at 491.  The Supreme 
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Court described the rationale behind the defense as follows: 
The grant to the inventor of the special privilege of 
a patent monopoly carries out a public policy adopted 
by the Constitution and laws of the United States, ‘to 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Inventors the Exclusive 
Rights . . . to their ‘new and useful’ inventions.  
But the public policy which includes inventions within 
the granted monopoly excludes from it all that is not 
embraced in the invention.  It equally forbids the use 
of the patent to secure an exclusive right or limited 
monopoly not granted by the Patent Office and which it 
is contrary to public policy grant. 
 
Id. at 492 (citation omitted).   
 
 In 1990, the Fourth Circuit became the first circuit to 
expressly recognize the defense of copyright misuse.  Lasercomb 
Am., 911 F.2d at 977-79.  Relying on “[t]he origins of patent 
and copyright law in England, the treatment of these two aspects 
of intellectual property by the framers of our Constitution, and 
the later statutory and judicial development of patent and 
copyright law in this country,” the court concluded that the 
misuse of copyright should be available as a defense to 
copyright infringement.  Id. at 974.  It further concluded that 
the existence of an antitrust violation was not a pre-requisite 
to a viable copyright misuse claim: 
[W]hile it is true that the attempted use of a 
copyright to violate antitrust law probably would give 
rise to a misuse of copyright defense, the converse is 
not necessarily true -- a misuse need not be a 
violation of antitrust law in order to comprise an 
equitable defense to an infringement action.  The 
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question is not whether the copyright is being used in 
a manner violative of antitrust law . . . but whether 
the copyright is being used in a manner violative of 
the public policy embodied in the grant of copyright.  
  
Id. at 978.  Consistent with this rationale, it described 
copyright misuse as arising from a copyright holder’s attempt to 
use its copyright in a particular expression “to control 
competition in an area outside the copyright.”  Id. at 979.  
Whatever the metes and bounds of the defense, it is one 
that is applied “sparingly.”  Apple Inc. v. Pystar Corp., 658 
F.3d 1150, 1157 (9th Cir. 2011).  Its focus is on the improper 
stifling of competition.  Id. at 1157-59.  
Meltwater contends that it has offered sufficient evidence 
that AP engaged in a per se violation of the antitrust laws to 
raise a question of fact that prevents summary judgment being 
granted on AP’s copyright infringement claim.  Specifically, 
Meltwater asserts that it has offered evidence that AP violated 
antitrust law “[b]y foisting a pricing structure and minimum 
target prices upon a licensing entity, and by sharing its own 
pricing information” with that licensing agency and its members.   
The licensing entity to which Meltwater is referring is 
NewsRight.  NewsRight is a joint venture between AP and other 
publishers formed in 2011 and publicly launched in 2012.  
NewsRight’s stated aim is to “work with third parties -- such as 
Case 1:12-cv-01087-DLC   Document 156    Filed 03/21/13   Page 75 of 91
 
 76 
commercial aggregators and media-monitoring companies -- to 
license content from a large set of major publishers and to 
allow both publishers and third-party licensees to track and 
analyze the use of news content online.”  Those news publishers 
that are members of NewsRight have authorized NewsRight to 
license their content on a nonexclusive basis.  So far, 
NewsRight has entered into two license agreements, but it has 
not yet licensed any AP content.  
Even assuming that this circuit were to adopt the 
affirmative defense of copyright misuse to a claim of copyright 
infringement, and assuming further that Meltwater had raised a 
question of fact as to whether AP shared its own pricing 
information with NewsRight and “imposed” a pricing structure on 
and minimum prices for the licenses offered by the joint 
venture, Meltwater has not shown that summary judgment should 
not be granted to AP on its copyright infringement claim.  AP’s 
alleged conduct does not amount to copyright abuse.  Nothing in 
the conduct alleged by Meltwater suggests that AP has improperly 
leveraged its copyrights to exert control over competition in 
the delivery of news.  Every one of its competitors, whether a 
member of NewsRight or not, retains the power to issue its own 
licenses according to whatever pricing scale it chooses.  AP 
does not create the news, control access to the news, or have 
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any power to restrict any other party’s entry into the business 
of reporting the news.  Meltwater has not explained how AP’s 
supposed actions would have interfered with the Copyright Act’s 
goal of “increas[ing] the store of creative expression for the 
public good.”  Video Pipeline, 342 F.3d at 205.   
Moreover, Meltwater’s proffered evidence does not even 
suggest any misconduct by AP.  Meltwater’s argument that AP has 
used its participation in NewsRight to engage in price fixing 
relies on essentially three documents.  The most significant of 
these is an email from 2011, in which AP suggests that the 
aggregator market be divided into three segments (Top players; 
Premium Institutional Specialists; and PR Community/Press 
Clipping Services) and then suggests minimum target licensing 
fees for NewsRight’s licenses within each of the segments.25
                     
25 The other two documents, two letters exchanged between AP and 
the Department of Justice, are about a proposed voluntary 
registry.  A version of that voluntary registry was apparently 
incorporated into NewsRight and nothing in that correspondence 
suggests misconduct.  
  
NewsRight ultimately rejected this approach and developed a 
different licensing structure.  Nothing in this opening gambit 
about the appropriate pricing structure for the creation of a 
new product by a joint venture suggests a violation of the 
antitrust laws.  In sum, Meltwater has not shown that the 
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doctrine of copyright misuse, even if adopted in this circuit, 
should prevent summary judgment being awarded to AP on its claim 
of copyright infringement.26
VI. Meltwater’s Motion for Summary Judgment on AP’s Secondary 
Infringement Claims 
   
 
 In addition to moving for summary judgment on the basis of 
its fair use defense, Meltwater has moved for summary judgment 
on AP’s claims of contributory and vicarious copyright 
infringement.  These claims are based on AP’s allegations that 
Meltwater has encouraged and assisted its customers to copy, 
store, and redistribute AP articles or portions of AP articles, 
                     
26 Meltwater contends that the evidence it has gathered raises a 
triable issue of fact on its copyright misuse defense, but 
argues in its Rule 56(d) motion that if the Court disagrees with 
Meltwater that Meltwater should be permitted to take further 
discovery about AP’s relationship with NewsRight since AP only 
produced documents “sufficient” to show NewsRight’s role in 
licensing AP content and did not respond completely to the 
document requests posed by Meltwater.    
Meltwater made a limited request of AP for documents 
concerning NewsRight, and that request related to the licensing 
of the Registered Articles by NewsRight.  It is undisputed that 
the Registered Articles were never licensed by NewsRight.  
Despite Meltwater’s narrow document request, AP searched all of 
its e-discovery custodians for communications with NewsRight 
concerning licensing efforts generally and produced such 
documents.  It also searched for hard-copy documents from those 
same custodians and produced documents sufficient to show 
NewsRight’s role in licensing AP content, among other things.  
Meltwater examined AP deponents at length about NewsRight.  In 
sum, Meltwater has not shown that it is entitled to further 
discovery on this issue before summary judgment may be entered 
for AP.  
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in particular, through the use of Meltwater’s archiving, 
Newsletter, and Newsfeed functions.  In its motion for summary 
judgment, Meltwater points out that AP has offered no evidence 
that an actual Meltwater customer ever stored or distributed 
full text versions of any of the thirty-three Registered 
Articles.27
VII. Meltwater’s Evidentiary Objections 
  Because there is no evidence of direct infringement 
by its customers, Meltwater contends, there can be no finding of 
contributory or vicarious copyright infringement.  In an 
affidavit submitted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
56(d), AP requests additional discovery.  Because Meltwater’s 
motion for summary judgment is based principally on AP's failure 
of proof, and because AP is entitled to additional discovery on 
these claims, Meltwater’s motion is denied without prejudice to 
renewal.   
 
 Meltwater has filed two motions to strike.  In Meltwater’s 
first motion, it seeks to strike: (1) the declaration of 
Elizabeth McNamara in its entirety and sixty-seven of the 
accompanying exhibits; (2) portions of the declaration of Sue 
                     
27 There is evidence that AP’s investigator copied and stored the 
full text of AP articles using a trial subscription to Meltwater 
News.  There is also evidence that Meltwater customers used 
excerpts from two of the Registered Articles and distributed 
them in ten newsletters.   
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Cross (“Cross”) and eight of the accompanying exhibits; (3) 
portions of the declaration of Thomas Curley (“Curley”) and four 
of the accompanying exhibits; (4) portions of the declaration of 
Joy Jones (“Jones”) and seven of the accompanying exhibits; (5) 
portions of the declaration of Thomas Kent; (6) portions of the 
declaration of John D. Rizzo and four of the accompanying 
exhibits; and (7) substantial parts of AP’s Rule 56.1 statement.  
The second motion seeks to strike: (1) the declaration of Alison 
B. Schary in its entirety and eight of the accompanying 
exhibits; and (2) portions of the declaration of Linda Steinman.  
In addition, both parties have raised objections in their Rule 
56.1 counterstatements of undisputed material facts.  Some of 
these objections have already been addressed.  To the extent 
that any objection is not discussed in this Opinion and the 
Court relied on the challenged evidence, the objection has been 
considered and rejected.  Three more categories of objections 
are addressed below.     
 First, however, it is important to note that most of the 
facts in this case are undisputed.  In particular, the Opinion’s 
description of Meltwater’s system is taken largely from 
Meltwater’s own documents and the accounts of its own affiants 
and deponents.  Many of Meltwater’s evidentiary objections 
instead focus on the manner in which AP characterizes certain 
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evidence.  The Court has disregarded the parties’ 
characterizations and relied on the underlying documents.    
 In its motions to strike, Meltwater argues that the Court 
should also strike statements and documents regarding matters 
occurring prior to 2009, because “AP unilaterally imposed a date 
restriction of January 1, 2009” in responding to Meltwater’s 
document requests.  Both parties preserved their objections to 
the production of older documents.  AP generally objected to 
production of documents predating January 1, 2009, and Meltwater 
objected to producing documents predating March 1, 2010.  
Despite that general objection, AP proceeded to produce 
responsive documents dated before 2009, including each of the 
documents submitted in connection with these summary judgment 
motions.  Meltwater never indicated during discovery that AP’s 
general objection was a concern and it did not seek to compel 
the production of other documents dated prior to 2009.  
Furthermore, AP placed no timeframe restriction on its witnesses 
when they were deposed.  Under the circumstances, Meltwater has 
shown no basis to strike all documents and statements relating 
to matters occurring prior to 2009, which in any event are few 
in number. 
 Meltwater has also objected on grounds of relevance to the 
submission by AP of many of the Meltwater documents produced in 
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discovery.  These include its promotional materials and samples 
of its News Reports.  It also objects on relevance grounds to 
the samples of Google News Alerts.  The objections to these and 
other documents on the ground of relevance have been considered 
and rejected.    
 Meltwater has raised objections to the declarations of 
Cross, Curley, and Jones, among others, on the ground that these 
individuals have not set forth facts showing that they have 
personal knowledge of the matters described in their 
declarations.  Cross has been AP’s Senior Vice President of 
Business Development and Partner Relations for the Americas 
since 2010.  Previously, she held a number of positions with AP, 
including Bureau Chief in Los Angeles, Vice President for the 
Western Region, Vice President for Online Services for U.S. 
Newspapers, and Senior Vice President for Global New Media and 
Media Markets for the Americas.  To the extent the Court has 
relied on Cross’s declaration it has been for facts such as the 
number of AP’s licensees, AP’s annual licensing revenues, AP’s 
agreements with its licensees, AP’s business model, and a 
description of AP Hosted.  All of these matters are plainly 
within her personal knowledge.  Similarly, Jones (Vice President 
for Platform Strategy and Operations) and Curley (former Chief 
Executive Officer) offered statements expressly based on their 
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personal knowledge about the composition of AP, NewsRight,28
CONCLUSION 
 AP’s 
licensing scheme, AP Hosted, and AP’s lack of contact with 
Meltwater.  Each of these declarants has described facts 
sufficient to demonstrate that they have personal knowledge of 
the matters referenced herein.      
 The plaintiff’s November 9, 2012 motion for summary 
judgment is granted, with one exception.  The defendants’ 
November 9 motion for summary judgment is denied.  The parties 
will be given an additional opportunity to address whether 
retrospective injunctive relief should be granted in this case.  
   
Dated: New York, New York 
  March 20, 2013 
   
 
                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     
28 Meltwater also makes an unfounded objection to Curley’s 
description of NewsRight on hearsay grounds.      
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Appendix 
 
Article #1 
 
Title: Help wanted at new casino for Toledo, Ohio 
Full Text Meltwater News Excerpt 
TOLEDO, Ohio (AP) -- Job 
seekers can roll the dice to 
land work at another of the 
four casinos coming soon to 
Ohio. 
Hollywood Casino Toledo 
has posted more than 600 job 
listings on its website this 
week.  Multiple media outlets 
report the positions include 
bar and restaurant workers, 
slots and table games 
supervisors, grounds keepers 
and security officers. 
The casino is scheduled 
to open in the spring with 
1,200 employees. 
The Cleveland casino, 
which will open first, 
advertised for 750 non-gaming 
jobs on Monday, while the 
Columbus casino posted 
openings for executive 
positions. 
Cincinnati also is 
getting a casino.  All four 
were approved by Ohio voters 
in 2009. 
(AP) TOLEDO, Ohio -- Job 
seekers can roll the dice to 
land work at another of the 
four casinos coming soon to 
Ohio.  Hollywood Casino 
Toledo has posted more than 
600 job listings on its 
website this week. . . . 
restaurant workers, slots and 
table games supervisors, 
groundskeepers and security 
officers.  The casino is 
scheduled to open in the 
spring with . . . 
 
 
 
Article #2 
 
Title: Wikileaks suspect’s trial near super-secure NSA 
Full Text Meltwater News Excerpt 
FORT MEADE, Md. (AP) -- The 
military intelligence complex 
an hour outside Washington 
where the WikiLeaks case goes 
FORT MEADE, Md. (AP) -- The 
military intelligence complex 
an hour outside Washington 
where the WikiLeaks case goes 
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to court this week is known as 
a cloak-and-dagger sanctum 
off-limits to the public -- a 
reputation that’s only partly 
true. 
Maryland's Fort Meade is, 
for the most part, an ordinary 
Army post, its 5,000-acres 
mostly made up of neat rows of 
army barracks and homes, a PX, 
and a golf course. 
Only one small part of 
the base houses the super-
secure compound of the code-
breaking National Security 
Agency. 
Yet that juxtaposition 
still provides the greatest 
irony: Pfc. Bradley Manning, 
the soldier accused of one of 
the largest intelligence 
heists in U.S. history, will 
stand trial in a military 
court room on the same post as 
the intelligence agency 
charged with covertly 
collecting and cracking 
secrets. 
Manning's case, a cause 
celebre for anti-secrecy 
activists, hackers and even 
human rights groups, is 
subject to unprecedented 
security restrictions. 
The military says Fort 
Meade was chosen for the 
Manning hearing not because of 
its secure location but 
because the garrison's 
Magistrate Court has the 
largest military courtroom in 
the Washington area.  It's 
where you would go to argue 
your case if military police 
pulled you over for breaking 
to court this week is known 
as a cloak-and-dagger sanctum 
off-limits to the public -- a 
reputation that's only partly 
true. 
. . . low-level clearance and 
a Lady Gaga CD.  The 
prosecution can only hope 
that their arguments, or the 
evidence, will reveal the 
secrets of how, . . . 
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the l5 to 35 mph speed limit. 
Like any Army post, Fort 
Meade does have security.  If 
you're on the entry list at 
the garrison's front gate, you 
can drive in unescorted after 
a routine check of your 
vehicle. 
NSA is located on a 
separate, far-harder-to-enter 
compound, contiguous with the 
main base. Entry requires the 
highest of clearances or the 
most diligent of escorts, and 
NSA's own elite detail 
provides security.  The 
compound is equipped with 
various electronic means to 
ward off an attack by hackers. 
The compound's experts 
include cryptologists, 
computer hackers and 
"siginters," the signals 
intelligence experts who can 
track a conversation inside an 
Iranian nuclear scientist's 
office from the vibrations of 
the windows. 
Yet despite their focus 
on cracking secrets, the 
agency itself is hardly 
hidden.  NSA's main complex is 
visible from a major highway, 
and features a U-shaped 
building with a couple of 
1980s-style glass office 
blocks attached, surrounded on 
all sides by a parking lot and 
a chain-link fence. 
You can study the 
buildings at your leisure, in 
photos posted to the NSA's own 
online photo gallery.  And you 
can test your own code-
breaking skills at the 
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agency’s National Cryptologic 
Museum, open to the public 
just outside the NSA compound.  
After punching a code or two 
into a genuine World War II 
German Enigma code-making 
machine, you can pick up a “No 
Such Agency” T-shirt at the 
gift shop. 
The throngs of reporters 
covering the Manning trial 
probably won't have time to 
see any of that.  They'll be 
busy following the case 
against a defendant alleged to 
be so devious and creative 
that he came up with a way to 
spirit away hundreds of 
thousands of classified files, 
armed only with guile, a low-
level clearance and a Lady 
Gaga CD.                                               
The prosecution can only 
hope that their arguments, or 
the evidence, will reveal the 
secrets of how, and why, so 
much classified information 
ended up online, for all the 
world to read. 
Even the NSA's experts 
might want to know that. 
 
Article #3 
 
Title: Sun shines on the mountain and Pearce rides again 
Full Text Meltwater News Excerpt 
BRECKENRIDGE, Colo. (AP) -- 
Basking in the sun and snow, 
surrounded by his fans and 
friends, Kevin Pearce carved 
sweet turns down a gentle run 
called “Springmeier” -- 
kicking up just enough powder 
behind him to remind people 
that, yes, this kid can still 
BRECKENRIDGE, Colo. -- 
Basking in the sun and snow, 
surrounded by his fans and 
friends, Kevin Pearce carved 
sweet turns down a gentle run 
called “Springmeier” -- 
kicking up just enough powder 
behind him to remind people 
that, yes, this kid can still 
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ride. 
The three trips he took down 
that hill, some might say, 
were a storybook ending to a 
life-altering journey that 
began when Pearce nearly died 
during a training accident 
while preparing for the 
Olympics. 
Or was it a new 
beginning? 
“That's kind of my goal,” 
Pearce said, “is to continue 
to have special days like 
this.” 
Yes, Tuesday was a 
special day -- the 24-year-old 
champion snowboarder's first 
trip down the mountain since 
Dec. 31, 2009, which is when 
he banged his head on the 
halfpipe in Utah while trying 
a difficult trick that, had he 
pulled it off a few months 
after that, might have won him 
a gold medal at the Vancouver 
Olympics. 
The accident left him in 
a coma and his life hung in 
the balance for several days. 
When he finally awoke, severe 
head trauma turned the most 
basic of activities -- 
walking, talking, seeing 
straight -- into pressing 
challenges for the young 
athlete. 
In the back of his mind, 
though, as he labored through 
his grueling rehabilitation, 
Pearce never gave up hope that 
he might ride again -- if not 
across a rail or through a 
halfpipe, then at least down a 
mountain. 
ride. . . . 
though, as he labored through 
his grueling rehabilitation, 
Pearce never gave up hope 
that he might ride again -- 
if not across a rail or 
through  a . . . 
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On a sunsplashed 
afternoon in the Colorado high 
country, 712 days after the 
accident, he did. 
The day began with a trip 
to Vail, where Pearce hooked 
up with snowboarding mogul 
Jake Burton and the close-knit 
group of pro snowboarders who 
call themselves the “Frends” -
- because there is no ‘I’ in 
friendship. 
After a few mellow trips 
on that mountain, Pearce came 
to Breckenridge to ride with 
other friends, along with the 
public, a few hundred of whom 
cheered when he walked out of 
the lunchroom and toward the 
lift, ready to ride again. 
“I didn't know if anyone 
was going to show up today,” 
Pearce said. “When I walked 
out there and there were all 
these people there to support 
me and have my back the way 
they have for the last two 
years, it brings this feeling. 
It's a hard feeling to 
explain.” 
Instead of sporting the 
old “I Ride For Kevin” 
stickers that dotted every 
mountainside after the 
accident, those on the slopes 
with him on this day wore 
stickers and T-shirts with a 
new message: “Ride With 
Kevin.” 
The return to the snow 
wasn’t without the most minor 
of falls, a very small tipping 
that came courtesy of a rider 
who bumped him on the hill.  
No damage done, though.  Only 
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smiles at the bottom, where 
two years of hard, emotional 
work -- filled with hundreds 
of tiny steps forward and a 
fair share of tiny steps back, 
as well -- culminated in a day 
that was never guaranteed. 
“The doctors said to me, 
‘Don’t take his hope away,’” 
said Pearce's mother, Pia. 
“And that's the message. It's 
about doing it, but doing it 
safely. It's about him making 
good choices. It's about him 
being a role model and a 
mentor for all those . . . 
athletes who get concussions. 
To be smart about it.  Enjoy 
life.  Have fun.  But when he 
needs to make a hard choice 
and not do something, as his 
life goes on, we need to see. 
Can he stop himself when he 
wants to take that jump?” 
Indeed, the future holds 
many more questions for 
Pearce, who, to those who 
don't know him, seems as 
healthy and happy as any 20-
something on the mountain. 
Even he concedes 
everything is not all perfect. 
“I don't think anyone in 
this room except my mom and my 
brother have any idea what's 
really going on with me right 
now,” Pearce said, a few hours 
after the ride.  “There's so 
much more than what you see.” 
But on this day, it wasn't so 
much about the road ahead as 
the celebration at hand.  Out 
on the mountain in a bright 
blue jacket, Pearce was the 
star, even with dozens of 
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world-class riders practicing 
nearby for the Dew Tour event 
that will take place on the 
same mountain later this week. 
Pearce will be on hand for 
that, though he knows joining 
those guys at the top is not 
in his future. 
“Jumps and halfpipes and 
rails and that stuff aren't 
important to me anymore,” he 
said.  “What's important to me 
is to be able to get up there 
and be happy with what I'm 
doing.  Riding powder.  Riding 
with all my friends.  There 
are so many things you can do 
up on the mountain that don't 
involve competition.  That 
stuff, that's the stuff I'm 
looking forward to the most.” 
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